

LC

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENTS
PRESERVATION

PART-BINDING

ON US FORCES
HEADQUARTERS
IN EUROPE

SC
RIALS FILE

- 2 MAR 1988

4481.953

HOLOCAUST

AGAIN FOR EUROPE



26097912

for RMS
use only

International Loan, Return Airmail within 4
weeks of date of receipt unless recalled earlier.

Request Ref. No.

101000-PT

If no other library indicated please return loan to:-
The British Library Document Supply Centre, Boston Spa,
Wetherby, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom, LS23 7BQ

092a

4481-9530

245a

TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

ON US FORCE'S HEADQUARTERS

IN EUROPE

245b [Holocaust again
for Europe]

260b [n.p.] 260c [1980]

092c &
490v

490a

INFORMATION BOOKS No 1



MAR 5/

INTRODUCTION

It's not every day that someone risks publishing a batch of Top Secret NATO plans. The risk of final war in Europe is, however, something that is always with us and the documents presented in this booklet are a blueprint for that war.

Timing their publication has been made horrifically simple: the Presidents and Premiers of the NATO bloc have effectively made that decision for us by vowing to step up their arms budgets and permit the stationing of new terror weapons in Europe. But are these NATO moves, particularly the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles, really in the best interests of western Europeans? Judging from the documents we now present, they are not.

NATO's modernization strategy turns essentially on two beliefs — first that the Warsaw Pact has a superiority in the European theatre and, second, that it sees political objectives which could be secured by making use of that superiority.

Neither belief is valid. The essential balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe is a matter of record — troop numbers are not significantly different, any technological superiority in western arms is balanced by greater standardization of Warsaw Pact equipment and so on and so forth.

Indeed, it may be possible to take the argument yet further and say that, in today's world, imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is impossible in theory as well as in practice. Given that the opposing blocs have roughly equivalent resources of human brain-power at their disposal and have developed their technology to a roughly equivalent level, then any imbalance must be corrected almost as soon as it develops.

To take an obvious example, if the Warsaw Pact has calculated nuclear yield requirements like the NATO ones revealed in this booklet, then you can bet your bottom dollar that a copy of the calculations is on someone's desk at the CIA's Langley, Virginia, headquarters.

NATO's leaders second belief, that the Warsaw Pact powers see a practical, political, advantage in launching aggression in Europe, is even more laughable than their supposed belief in Warsaw Pact military superiority.

It is laughable on both political and military grounds. Though one scenario outlined in the NATO documents which we now publish appears to envisage broad civilian support in eastern Europe for a nuclear strike against the area's towns and villages, no one in their right minds can seriously believe that any survivors of holocaust, in whichever part of Europe, will feel anything but hatred for those who have killed their friends and families.

Militarily, the political advantage theory collapses because it is based on the false premise that tactical nuclear strikes can comprise the sum total of a nuclear war. That concept, always considered doubtful, was finally demolished earlier this year by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, a British Government-linked body, which successfully demonstrated that tactical nuclear strikes would have to be followed quickly by strategic strikes if base communications facilities were not to be destroyed by the enemy.

With both the military superiority and the political advantage arguments out of the way — and the absolute certainty that NATO no more believes in those arguments than do the publishers of this booklet — what's left and, even more interestingly, why are apparently rational western leaders still mouthing what they know to be arrant nonsense?

The answer, as appears from documents reproduced in this booklet, is that, though there is no "Soviet threat", there is a very real American threat to Europe.

Now, at first reading, that view probably looks very much like Soviet propaganda, and pretty cheap propaganda to boot. Unfortunately for any of our readers who never

believe anything with even a whiff of the Soviet viewpoint about it, the evidence that the US is prepared to sacrifice Europe to its own interests is overwhelming.

Discounting evidence such as that of Mrs. Verrept, the NATO defector who popped up at a press conference in east Berlin earlier this year and claimed direct knowledge of US plans to leave Europe to an irradiated fate, positions taken by US leaders themselves and by the authors of the documents herewith amply demonstrate the point.

Historians would even claim that the sacrificing of Europe has been a long-term aim of at least some sections of influential opinion in the States. Harry S. Truman, they would point out, won a fame of sorts early in World War II by suggesting that Britain and Germany should be left to tear each others guts out, with America picking up the profitable pieces later.

Analysis of war-time discussions between Britain and the US suggest that, in a modified form, this view reflected in official US thinking, with "lease-lend" and financial subsidies to Britain being manipulated to ensure post-War advantage to the US. In the immediate post-War years, American policies towards West Germany certainly served both to secure dominant political positions for the US in that country and to develop the West German economy at Britain's expense.

Today, Senator Nunn serves as an excellent replacement for Truman. More "European" than the Europeans, his only interest seems to lie in persuading American's west European allies to take more and more exposed positions. There are plenty of others like him.

To some extent their arguments are conditioned by simple economic considerations — put at its most basic, missile business is good business and America's military-industrial complex needs all the good business going if it is to face up to the current recession.

With the bulk of the United States' burgeoning electronics industry ultimately dependent on defence funds, Cruise is a particularly satisfactory proposition. The fact that

it hasn't worked very well so far is good news for everyone, but particularly good news for the electronics interests who stand to make at least as much from research as from production.

For the military-industrial complex as a whole, however, profits from the actual production and installation of 600 new medium-range missiles are the big thing. The reluctance on the part of many of the complex's spokesmen to come out against Carter in the run-up to this year's Presidential election may well be explained by reluctance to interfere with a missiles programme with which his name is inextricable linked.

Horrifying a thought though it is, it is even possible that the amendments to America's nuclear strategy announced shortly before the Democratic convention — amendments that tie the strategy yet more closely to medium-range missile based tactical strikes — are part of the price which Carter has been prepared to pay for the complex's electoral support. This view is strengthened by the apparent ignorance of the changes on the part of E. Muskie, a possible Carter challenger.

There is, however, more to the United States' stance than more short-term economic gain.

Essentially, the publishers of this booklet believe, the attitude of the most important circles in the US towards the Russians has hardened not only in words but in fact. Support for this view comes from most, if not all, the events of the year or so past.

In fact we're deeper in it than ever before because the European ingredients are present in even greater measure. Historically, western Europe has been cast as a US bridge-head that may be destroyed in the final conflict: Now, the thinking seems to be that its destruction is to be a vital part of the plan.

Put it this way — improved relations between the countries of the two parts of Europe reduces the strength of America in the western part and increases the economically-attractive (to the Europeans) tendency to improve those relations

to the point at which US domination is yet further weakened and, ultimately, is destroyed.

Therefore, or so the US top-level argument seems to run, it is necessary to maintain intra-European tensions and the placing of the new missiles is a good way of ensuring they are maintained, perhaps even increased.

The argument, however, goes yet further. The missiles serve to lure the Russians forward in a war situation, providing increased opportunities for US forces to destroy them with the precise tactical weapons that had served as the initial lure. Pretty neat, isn't it — for the Americans, that is. Europe would, of course, have been destroyed, an "unavoidable casualty" of a pre-planned nuclear scenario.

"Le Monde" expressed itself with a classic piece of that famous French logic last December when it said that the missiles deployment proposal laid emphasis on the strategy of US "isolation" and of purely "European" war, making possible use of strategic weaponry no longer the big issue. NATO Secretary-General Dr Luns made essentially the same point when he spoke to "Die Welt", the west German daily, the previous month.

Explaining why NATO and the US were so keen on installing the new weapons, Luns said: "At present we have no deterrent, except US intercontinental strategic missiles, to counter the new Soviet weapons. We have to rely on those strategic missiles. It means, however, that any nuclear conflict would be escalated accordingly. Therefore we should have to ask the American people to risk their lives for the sake of our security".

Whereas, with the medium-range weapons in place, European people would be expected to lay down their lives for Americans... Big deal! Love the American way of life or hate it, few Europeans would vote to die for it — if they were given the chance to express their view on the matter in the first place.

Yet, under the new dispensation, that is precisely what we are being asked to do. Having decided that the tactical strikes will emanate from western Europe, the United States

has effectively decided also that all retaliatory tactical and strategic strikes will be aimed at western Europe, thus solving, for the United States, the defects of the tactical strike theory revealed by the Institute of Strategic Studies and mentioned earlier in this Introduction.

It is even quite possibly the case, as a growing number of experts believe, that United States' thinking looks on a nuclear war confined to Europe as no more than the ultimate extension of the "little wars" of the post World War II variety, "little wars" in which the US has played so notable a part.

After all, the Americans dropped more explosive on Vietnam than was dropped in the whole of World War II so nuclear obliteration of an entire continent is not so very drastic a step when weighed against the expected gain.

Final thought on this whole "scenario" must be this — what would happen if the Russians really did attack and capture, say, Frankfurt-am-Main? How does the whole concept of current NATO plans relate to that eventuality?

The answer must be the unthinkable, an American nuclear strike at, say, Stalingrad, followed by the inevitable counter-strike at San Francisco and, seconds to minutes later, goodbye everything and everybody. In other words, even if the Russians really were the potential aggressors that they're so often said to be, the current NATO strategy contains no credible element of European defence, only the preparations for US offence.

How does all this relate to the documents which we now present? The answer, unfortunately, is that it bears a very close connexion indeed, a connexion which has actually become closer in the course of recent days.

Our collection of Top Secret paperwork dates from early in the 1960s and last got a major airing in the west European press a decade and more ago. Newspaper legend has it that the documents were amongst those photographed by an American serviceman in NATO vaults near Paris and subsequently passed over by him to the Russians. True or false, the legend has never been seriously challenged in the

west, and neither has the authenticity of the documents.

Even though copies of the documents have been floating around for this comparatively long period of time, they have never been available in one batch and in convenient book form with the passing of time, those who have seen them have tended to think of them as out of date.

So far as specific nuclear yield requirements mentioned are concerned, this is almost certainly correct. Details of targets will have changed, up-dated technology will have had an effect on the precise figures given and, beyond all possible doubts, the list of targets will have got longer.

On the other hand, there are no grounds whatsoever for believing that the underlying concepts implicit in the documents will have altered to any material extent. Targets in West Germany and Austria will, for example, still be listed for the very good reason that the geographical limitations on possible Warsaw Pact military approach routes has not changed.

Earlier this year rumours were going the rounds in western Europe that some of the more drastic elements in the attack plans we now reveal had actually been dusted off in the Pentagon, and found ideal as the basis for a renewed "forward" strategy. Doubted at the time by most observers, including us, these rumours seem very much to be borne out by the "new" nuclear strategy put forward in Washington in August 1980.

Documents included in the present booklet include document 100-1 — a draft proposal for a treaty on the status of American forces in NATO countries in the event of an "emergency". Its essence lies in the stipulation that the American army command will become the supreme authority, in other words that America's allies will be under a martial law occupation.

The second document, 10-1, appeared in the west European press during the summer of 1969. It revealed the long-suspected fact that the US Army contains a special military formation dedicated to the waging of psychological and guerilla war in the case of an emergency. Nuclear, chemical

and germ weapons are to be used not only in the eastern bloc countries but also in neutral countries and even in countries of the NATO bloc.

Interestingly, Britain appears to get off very lightly in both these documents. This could well be because the British Visiting Forces Act, plus various agreements dating back to the late-1940s, effectively reproduce the terms of the draft agreement in document 100-1. Further, Britain alone appears to have the rather doubtful honour amongst NATO countries of providing units to the US psychological and guerilla war teams.

The third document reproduced, that on Nuclear Yield Requirements, saw the light of day in the west German news magazine "Stern" back in February 1970. This shows the wide range of targets considered suitable for nuclear attack — a range unlikely to be very significantly reduced by the "new" strategy — and the fact that these are sited in neutral and NATO countries as well as in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. 93 nuclear bombs would be used to destroy 47 targets in west Germany; 31 would wipe out 14 targets in Syria and a further 39 would destroy 17 targets in Iraq.

Perhaps most interesting of all those reproduced is a further document (Operation Plan 100-6 of the Supreme Commander, American Forces, Europe), a copy of which we recently succeeded in acquiring.

This document has been the subject of discussion amongst the leading lights of western Europe in recent months, discussion at least partly caused by its use as a lever to secure compliance with US plans by the European NATO allies. It shows that the fate of existing governments in western Europe will depend on the extent of their willingness and ability to enlist effective support for US actions in the event of an emergency.

As things stand, the Americans would think themselves entitled to remove existing governments in Holland, Denmark, Norway and Belgium, all because these governments have opposed the missile deployment proposals. True, an "emergency" would be needed before governmental courage could

be met with this "reward" — but what price that a Reagan Administration, for example, would be prepared to wait that long?

One final, and rather interesting, side-light thrown on US policy is the appearance in the documents, drawn up in 1962, of that peculiarly 1970s and 1980s word, "dissident". Cast in the mould of a latter-day Halyna SS, "dissident groups" figure largely in the documents calculation of likely support for US forces in eastern Europe. The authors of this Introduction, at least, will never feel quite the same about "dissidents" again.

However that may be, the overall reaction of those favoured west Europeans who have happened to read newspapers in which any of these documents has previously appeared has been one of shock. It is not a pleasant thought that we could be on the brink of nuclear catastrophe courtesy of our "staunchest ally", Uncle Sam. Yet this and other conclusions are inescapable.

It is quite clear that, whatever their pledges to NATO, the Americans have their own plans for war with Russia and that west Europeans figure in these plans only in so far as their names will appear on the lists of dead and injured. So far as possible, these plans have clearly been kept secret even from the leaders of other NATO powers: When a couple of British MPs asked questions about the documents earlier this year, for example, Defence Secretary Francis Pym replied that he was having to seek comments on them from the Pentagon.

Even more shocking, however, than all these revelations was the further indication, one made wholly explicit in the documents, that all talk of nuclear war being a matter under the control of the US President, with his red button, and a host of his colleagues, all with special keys, is complete hogwash.

In fact, it is ordinary US Army officers — "Deer hunters" in the Vietnam mould, perhaps — who have the power to commence a nuclear war. An Italian paper, "ABC", expressed commonly-held feelings on that score when it said,

on July 4, 1969, that "Use of nuclear weapons need not be regarded as something unusual any longer; what is surprising, however, is the fact that the decision to use nuclear weapons will depend on the officers who will be in command of the armed forces in a given region..."

One "Deer hunter" — One Hiroshima. That's the ghastly equation wrapped up in the documents jargon-laden prose. Now nip down the library and take a look at some Hiroshima, or Nagasaki, photographs — and think about them in the context of Glasgow, Marseille, Frankfurt or your own home town.

The French statesman Clemenceau once remarked that, "Peace is too serious a thing to be left in the hands of Generals". For once he was right — and we could all do a lot worse than make up our minds to force the hands of red-neck US captains far, far, away from the nuclear trigger.

"Stern" gave further weight to this thought back in February 1970 when it published an article head-lined, "Rhine and Main Under Fire: US Generals Planned To Turn West Germany Into A Burnt Land". "According to a secret order", said "Stern", "permission to use nuclear weapons depends only on a fixed limit of time; US army officers in both 'friendly and neutral countries' would, after the limit had passed, only have to seek their Commander-in-Chief's permission to use nuclear weapons if they wanted to use nuclear weapons with explosive power equivalent to 10 kilotons or more".

To give you an idea of what that means in practical terms, the explosive power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was some 20 kilotons. The effect of a 10 kiloton "no restriction" bomb on a busy city centre could well include anything up to 50,000 immediate deaths and a great many more in subsequent years.

In return for all this, west German right-wingers please note, your dream of German reunification is specifically rejected by one clause in the documents — not even a nuclear-blasted united Germany will be permitted in the post-war world of total United States' world rule. Hitler himself might

well have appreciated that approach to global domination.

What the documents show, when taken as a whole, is that US thinking is still dominated by preparations for nuclear war and that, by permitting the Americans to instal 7,000 or more nuclear weapons on our soil and actively to contemplate the annihilation of Europe, we west Europeans are proving ourselves to be short-sighted and plain flabby.

As the American magazine, "Ramparts", said in October 1969, "The plan is clear evidence of the fact that the American attitude towards the allies corresponds to their motto, 'Better Dead Than Red', although the American chemical and nuclear weapons can cause the most terrible death".

In the course of the past decade and more, not one single US official has so much as attempted to challenge the documents' authenticity. For practical purposes, any hopes that they might be a brilliant fake can no longer exist. And, for the reasons already outlined and for one more, all-important, reason, there are no grounds for believing them to be out-dated.

Like all military plans, these are plans for the future. No one draws up a strategic programme for events intended to take place tomorrow or the next day and history recalls many a strategic plan which laid ready for far longer than 18 years. Imperial Germany did not wait until 1914 to draw up its plans for World War I.

The real clincher, however, is America's present-day attitude towards western Europe. They still consider our half of the continent as the most likely theatre for any war with Russia, as their very terminology proves.

Always they speak of the "European theatre of war". Where in their plans, in NATO's plans or, for that matter, in the Russians' plans has anyone ever heard it said that there is to be an "American theatre of war". The phrase itself sounds absurd, for the good reason that it is never used and never considered. No, the Americans' favoured "war scenario" features a war in Europe, with America unharmed and our continent a charnel house.

In all probability, more refined plans have been prepared

in the years since 1962. Even more probably, the details of current plans have been successfully kept secret from America's NATO allies. Beyond all possible doubt, the extent of nuclear discretion allowed to US army officers under current plans is at least as wide as that allowed under the 1962 plan. Development of "theatre nuclear weapons", including neutron weapons, in the subsequent years very likely means that the effective leeway given US officers has been much increased.

As for the much-vaunted "dual control" system, said to give the governments of the European NATO allies a veto over the use of US nuclear weaponry on their national territories, our documents — and any conceivable up-date — shows this to be meaningless.

The "dual control" procedures may sound very fine, but what can they possibly be worth in an actual "emergency" when the US army command (document 100-1) would hold supreme authority. In any event, the odds are that any west European NATO governments who might seem likely to seek to exercise their veto "rights" would have been toppled before the possibility of them doing so arose.

Effective control over the Americans' nuclear weaponry in western Europe will, in fact, rest with US officers in the field. Few, if any, of these will have the time, perhaps even the inclination, to obtain Presidential sanction first.

In short, no one should have any illusions that there is any reality in any aspect of all the talk of "checks and balances" carefully controlling the actual use of nuclear weaponry. The danger in nuclear illusions is that none of us will ever have the chance to suffer from them twice.

Worse and worse, the very fact that the Americans' power to determine the moment when a European-based nuclear war is effectively unbridled means that the chances of their using that power are greatly increased. They can do it, they believe they can escape the consequences and, most importantly, they believe they can reap all the possible benefits.

If you still don't believe that — and you will once you have studied the documents themselves — there remains the fact of nuclear "accidents".

Every reader will recall, most probably with a shudder, the computer errors of last autumn and this spring. The most important aspect of these in many ways is the acknowledged fact that American forces went on alert without the need for any authorization from President J. Carter or Defense Secretary Harold A. Browne.

Where were the "checks and balances" then — and will there be time to correct the consequences of computer error once medium-range missiles are installed on west European soil. Where will an accidentally-fired Cruise be "aborted" once it has crossed the North Sea from eastern England — a few hundred feet above Frankfurt or Copenhagen, perhaps?

The facts are clear. "Le Monde Diplomatique", the prestigious French newspaper, was right when it warned recently that the installation of the new medium-range missiles in Europe is a trap for the Europeans themselves, one from which only America can gain.

We shouldn't be in that trap and we ought to get out of it as quickly as possible. The Americans can dream of war with Russia if they want to, but not if their dreams include us being burnt, blasted and shocked out of existence in the process.

London, October 1980

PUBLISHERS' NOTE:

This booklet is published as a public service and as part of the growing campaigns against nuclear war and for freedom of information on important issues. We hope to extend this service in the future.

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN

USCINCEUR NR 100-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

	(Pages)
M - Maps and Charts	5
App 1 - Deployment of Cartographic Forces	1
TAB A - US Army Forces	1
TAB B - US Navy Forces	1
TAB C - US Air Force Forces	1
App 2 - Maps and Charts Depots	2
N - Civil Affairs	9
App 1 - Organizations Available for Planning	2
App 2 - Definitions	2
App 3 - Status of Forces Agreement	4
App 4 - Civil Affairs Planning	1
App 5 - Sample Proclamation	1
App 6 - Commissions and Committees	2
O - Information Activities	3
App 1 - Joint Armed Forces Information Center	3
App 2 - Field Press Censorship	3


TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCPAC NR 100-1

ANNEXES:

- A Not used.
- B Assignment of Forces
- C Command Relationships
- D Intelligence
- E Logistics and Personnel
- F Communications-Electronics
- G Not used
- H Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
- I Unconventional Warfare (Issued separately)
- J Psychological Operations
- K Not used
- L Not used
- M Maps and Charts
- N Civil Affairs
- O Information Activities

AUTHENTICATION:


B. E. SPIVY
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

SECRET

Headquarters
US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO 128, US Forces

Appendix 3 to Annex N Civil Affairs
USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

DRAFT OF AN EMERGENCY STATUS OF FORCES (SOF) AGREEMENT

(It is assumed that such an Emergency SOF Agreement will be concluded in the form of an Exchange of Notes between the Foreign Ministry or other appropriate authority of (country) and the US Ambassador, or Commander of the US Forces in (country).)

PREAMBLE

1. The Embassy of the United States of America (the Commander US Forces in) presents its (his) compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the discussions that have taken place between us concerning the status of US Forces deployed, or to be deployed, in at the request of the Government, have led to agreement as follows:

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

2. a. The designated US commander or, in his absence, the senior US military commander present shall have exclusive control of the US Forces and the direction thereof.

b. The US Forces shall have the right to occupy any area or facility considered necessary for the accomplishment of their mission or for their safety and continued security, as determined by US military commanders, and to install such equipment therein as they shall deem necessary for these purposes.

c. Military commanders of the US Forces may take such measures as they deem necessary to provide adequate security for their installations, personnel and equipment, and for the movement of supplies and personnel in . Within installations utilized by the US military forces, military commanders shall have absolute and full authority to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. Outside such installations, military police of the US Forces shall have full authority, subject to such further arrangements as may be made with the local police authorities, to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. In the event of acts of violence against US installations, equipment, or personnel by persons other than members of the US Forces, such persons may be apprehended by the US Forces and turned over to the Government of for appropriate disposition in accordance with laws of that country.

THIS APPENDIX CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES

Change 3 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-1
N. 3.1.1

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY

SECRET

Appendix 3 to Annex N Civil Affairs
USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

d. In the event of internal disorders which may materially affect the mission or security of the US Forces, such as armed violence or widespread rioting, the Government of _____ will endeavor to quell such disorders with its own resources. However, should these measures prove ineffective, or should the Government of _____ request assistance, or should the US military commander consider that the Government of _____ does not possess the capability of quelling such disorders effectively or in time, the US Forces may take such action as the US military commander deems necessary, either unilaterally or in cooperation with the Government of _____.

e. The Government of _____ shall make available to the US Forces such information and intelligence reports as will assist them in achieving their mission or as the US military commander requests.

f. The authorities of the US shall have the exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over any member of the US Forces, except those who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in _____. The authorities of the US undertake to maintain discipline over such persons and to insure full respect by them for the laws of _____.

g. No civil action shall be brought in the courts of _____ against any member of the US Forces.

h. Claims arising out of the acts or omissions of the military members of the US Forces; of civilian employees of the US Forces who are not _____ nationals and out of acts or omissions of employees of the US Forces who are nationals of _____ which occur while they are acting within the scope of their employment, may be referred to a US foreign claims commission for settlement under claims legislation of the US.

i. Property of the US Forces, its instrumentalities, and of its members shall be permitted to enter and exit _____ free of customs duties, taxes, other fees or inspection.

j. The US Forces and its members may receive and send mail, or packages, both personal and official, through US postal facilities or any other channels free of any duties, taxes, other fees or inspection.

k. The US Forces may undertake such military movements as are required.

l. The US Forces, its instrumentalities, and the members thereof shall be exempt from any and all fees, charges and taxes whether direct or indirect of _____ or its political subdivisions.

SECRET

Appendix 3 to Annex N (Civil Affairs)
USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

m. The Government of _____ will furnish to units of the US Forces, free of charges of any kind and without present or future US liability for claims arising out of the US use thereof, installations and facilities which are determined to be necessary to support US Forces in their mission. The US Forces may develop areas and facilities made available to them by the Government of _____. Expenses involved therein shall be borne by the US Government, except where such development is for the combined use of the United States and _____. In which case the cost shall be borne by the two Governments on the basis of proportionate usage. The US Government will be under no obligation to restore these areas to their original use or to repair roads and bridges utilized by the US Armed Forces, and will be held harmless by the Government of _____ for any and all claims for the restoration or the repair thereof. The United States shall retain title to all US-owned removable property placed within agreed areas and facilities, and may remove such property from _____ or may upon the departure of its forces from _____ otherwise dispose of such property to the Government of _____ free from all local taxes, duties, or fees.

n. Official vehicles of the US Forces shall be distinctly marked and shall be exempt by _____ from registration, licensing, or any tax payable in respect to the use of vehicles. Authorized operators of vehicles of the US Forces shall be exempt from compliance with the local laws and regulations pertaining to the operation and use of vehicles.

o. The US Forces will conform to the traffic rules and regulations of _____ to the extent that exigencies of the military situation permit.

p. The Government of _____ shall provide, within the limit of its capability, under mutually satisfactory financial arrangements, all services and supplies necessary to support the US Forces. The items to be provided will be determined through mutual agreement of the authorities of _____ and the US military authorities. The US Forces may purchase or procure from the local economy, either directly or through the Government of _____, any items needed in the performance of the military mission.

q. The Government of _____ shall procure local labor required for support of the US Forces as requested by the latter, both as to the numbers needed and the types of skill required. This labor shall be provided to the US Forces at the expense of the Government of _____. Such employees shall be deemed for all legal purposes to be employees of the Government of _____, which among other matters will assume responsibility for, and save the US Government harmless from, all claims arising from acts or the omissions of such employees done other than in the performance of duties assigned by the US Forces.

SECRET

Appendix 3 to Annex N Civil Affairs
USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

r. The Government of _____ authorizes aircraft of the US Forces to land in and overfly areas subject to _____ jurisdiction as may be required, without any charges, taxes, or fees whatsoever. The Government of _____ authorizes US naval vessels and vessels transporting cargoes for the US Forces to enter the territorial waters and harbors without inspection and free of all taxes, custom duties, charges and fees.

s. The Government of _____ authorizes the US Forces to bring nuclear weapons into _____; to station them at such locations as may be deemed necessary.

t. This Agreement shall come into force immediately upon being signed by both parties, and shall remain in force until ninety days after the departure of the US Forces from _____, unless previously terminated by mutual agreement. Both the English and the _____ texts of this Agreement are equally authentic.

u. Members of the US Forces include military members of the US Forces, civilian personnel accompanying, serving with, or employed by the US Forces who are not ordinarily resident in _____ and the dependents of such persons.

FINAL CLAUSE

3. The Embassy of the United States of America (the Commander, US Forces in _____) would appreciate confirmation by the Foreign Ministry that the above provisions have been agreed to by the Government of _____.

4. The Embassy of the United States of America (the Commander, US Forces in _____) avails itself (himself) of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its (his) highest consideration.

SECRET

Annex N to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1
CIVIL AFFAIRS

J. An Emergency SOF Agreement will be concluded prior to the initiation of hostilities in accordance with following country priorities:

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| <u>1</u> Norway. | <u>6</u> Italy. |
| <u>2</u> Greece. | <u>7</u> Netherlands. |
| <u>3</u> Turkey. | <u>8</u> Belgium. |
| <u>4</u> West Germany. | <u>9</u> Luxembourg. |
| <u>5</u> France. | <u>10</u> Denmark. |

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Command, Civil affairs command will follow military command.
- b. Signal, Civil affairs units will rely upon common user service.

J. P. MC CONNELL
General USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief

APPENDICES:

1. Organizations Available For Planning
2. Definitions
3. Status Of Forces Agreement
4. Civil Affairs Planning
5. Sample Proclamation
6. Commissions and Committees

AUTHENTICATION:

B Espiny

B. E. SPIVY
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

Change 3 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex K to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. General. This annex provides guidance for the employment of chemical and biological (CB) munitions by UW forces.

b. Enemy Forces. Annex C: Intelligence.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) CINCUSAREUR.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include providing munitions at time and place designated by COMSOTFE.

(b) Renders technical assistance when required.

(2) CINCUSNAVEUR.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include logistical and service support at USNAVEUR departure point.

(b) Provides delivery means for movement of CB munitions from departure point to the operational area.

(3) CINCUSAFE.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include logistical and service support at USAFE departure point.

(b) Provides delivery means for movement of CB munitions from departure point to the operational area.

2. (TS) MISSION. Employ chemical and biological munitions in support of unconventional warfare.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) General. Specific targets for the employment of chemical

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10.

TOP SECRET

Annex K to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS

and biological munitions, which includes defoliants, herbicides, and anti-crop agents, will be designated as the situation and operational requirements dictate.

(2) UW forces submit target requests to COMSOTFE for CB munitions. Requests will contain pertinent data as to location, time, circumstances of and justification for employment.

(3) COMSOTFE analyzes target requests in light of USCINCPAC's operational plans. If requests are approved, COMSOTFE coordinates details of delivery of CB munitions to operational area.

(4) When directed by COMSOTFE, CB munitions and training assistance may be extended to guerrilla and indigenous forces. The employment of CB munitions, where practicable, will be supervised by trained and qualified U.S. personnel to insure that the employment is restricted to the minimum essential for military requirements.

b. 10th Special Forces Group (Abn).

(1) Plans for and conducts CB operations on order.

(2) When directed, train, advise and supervise guerrilla and indigenous forces in the employment of CB munitions.

(3) Provides qualified personnel authorized to inventory and receipt for allocated CB munitions at storage or designated departure point.

c. SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group. Provides intelligence support and assets in connection with employment of CB munitions in selected UW operational areas.

4. (U) LOGISTICS. Annex G.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command: Annex B.

b. Signal: Annex F.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

ECJC-J

APO 128, US Forces
October 1962

SUBJECT: Change 3 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1 (U)

TO: See DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded herewith is Change 3 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1.

2. The purpose of this Change is to publish Annex N, Civil Affairs.

3. Subject Change consists of new and revised pages. Addressees are requested to remove old pages and enter new or revised pages as listed below.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Remove Old Pages</u>	<u>Enter New Pages</u>
Table of Contents	11a	11a
Basic Plan	12	12
Annex N		N-1 thru 9
Appendix 1 to Annex N		1-2
Appendix 2 to Annex N		1-2
Appendix 3 to Annex N		1-4
Appendix 4 to Annex N		1
Appendix 5 to Annex N		1-
Appendix 6 to Annex N		1-2

4. Notation regarding this Change will be made on the "Record of Changes and Corrections" sheet. Rescinded pages will be destroyed in accordance with pertinent service regulations.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl:
Change 3 to USCINCEUR
OPLAN NR 100-1 (U)

B. E. Espy
B. E. ESPY
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

THIS LETTER CONSISTS OF 1 PAGE

Regrade UNCLASSIFIED upon
removal of Inclosure

Cop M 177 Copies

EUCOM TS SER 1200-C

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 183, US Forces

**OPERATION PLAN
COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1**

Map Reference: 1:4,000,000, Europe, AMS 1202
1:4,000,000, USSR, AMS 1203

Task Organization: Support Operations Task Force Europe
10th Special Forces Group (Abn)
Berlin Special Forces Detachments
SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. **General.** The purpose of this plan is to provide guidance and delineate responsibilities for the initiation and conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) in the USCINCEUR area of coordinating responsibility. This plan is based upon the provisions of the EC-100 series OPlans.

b. **Enemy Forces.** Annex C, Intelligence.

c. **Friendly Forces.**

(1) CINCPAC conducts UW operations within his area of responsibility in support of U.S. and Allied military operations. CINCLANT and CINCNELM (until disestablished by activation of a U.S. Middle East Command) conducts UW operations in the Middle East and Africa exclusive of the area assigned to USCINCEUR, as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) CINCUSAREUR.

(a) Establishes a Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB) at Orleans, France and provides for its external security.

(b) Deploys the 10th Special Forces Group (Abn) (SFGA) to the SFOB and releases operational control to COMSOTFE upon arrival at the base. Unless previously directed by USCINCEUR, the movement will be made on Declaration of Reinforced Alert.

(c) Assigns the Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFODs) in Berlin to the 10th SFGA upon completion of their United States Command of Berlin (USCOB) mission.

(d) Provides administrative, logistic and communications support for Hq SOTFE, 10th SFGA, and to Army units attached to Hq SOTFE.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED, DOD DIR 5200.10

COPY 11 OF 11 COPIES

This OPLAN consists of 4 pages

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1

(3) CINCUSNAVEUR.

(a) Provides and employs Naval forces to assist COMSOTFE in the conduct and support of UW.

(b) Provides U.S. Navy supplies and equipment for UW operations.

(4) CINCUSAFE.

(a) Provides airlift if directed for the movement of 10th SFGA from present location to SFOB.

(b) Provides air support for UW operations.

(c) Prepares plans for the conduct of UW air operations, based upon tactical air transport requirements and guidance developed by COMSOTFE.

(d) Provides U.S. Air Force supplies and equipment for UW operations.

(5) COMCIAEUR.

(a) Conducts clandestine UW operations to support SACEUR/USCINCEUR OPlans.

(b) Reports to USCINCEUR the capability of in-place and/or externally held assets to support UW operations.

(c) Supports military UW forces in area of CIA technical or operational competence to include: equipment, advice, training, communications and security.

(d) Provide SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group to COMSOTFE for operational control.

d. Assumption.

During the chaos and disruption attending the outbreak of war, scattered indigenous individuals and groups will be disposed to take active measures against Soviet Bloc forces.

2. (TS) MISSION.

Conduct unconventional warfare operations as directed by USCINCEUR.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

TOP SECRET

**OPERATION PLAN
COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1**

a. Concept of Operations - Annex A.

b. 10th Special Forces Group (Abn).

(1) Maintain Special Forces units ready for commitment in accordance with applicable COMSOTFE OPlans.

(2) Plan for the conduct of UW operations in areas designated in Annex D.

(3) Conduct UW operations as directed.

(4) Assume command of SFODs in Berlin upon completion of their USCOB mission.

c. SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group.

(1) Provide current intelligence regarding the situation in designated and potential UW areas.

(2) Direct and control the activities of those assets and supporting mechanisms provided by COMCIAEUR.

(3) Provide plans for reception of SFODs and for effecting contact between SFODs and resistance leaders.

(4) Provide information regarding E&E and subversion operations conducted by COMCIAEUR which may be pertinent to the planning and conduct of SOTFE operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt and for execution when directed.

(2) Conduct tasks as indicated in:

Annex C - Intelligence.

Annex F - Communications/Electronics.

Annex G - Logistics.

Annex H - Naval Operations.

Annex I - Air Operations.

Annex J - Employment of Nuclear Weapons.

Annex K - Employment of Chemical and Biological Munitions.

Annex L - Psychological Operations.

Annex M - Evasion and Escape.

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Annex G.

5. (TS) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command Relationships - Annex B.

b. Communications/Electronics - Annex F.

c. Command Posts.

(1) Hq SOTFE

Paris, France
(Initial)

Lariboisiere Caserne
Fontainebleau, France
(as announced)

(2) Hq 10th SFGA (SFOB)

Orleans, France

(3) SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group

Camp des Loges, France
(Initial)

Lariboisiere Caserne
Fontainebleau, France
(as announced)

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

ANNEXES:

A - Concept of Operations

B - Command Relationships

C - Intelligence

D - UW Areas

E - Forces Available

F - Communications/Electronics

G - Logistics

H - Naval Operations

I - Air Operations

J - Employment of Nuclear Weapons

K - Employment of Chemical and Biological Munitions.

L - Psychological Warfare

M - Evasion and Escape

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex A to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. (TS) MISSION. Conduct unconventional warfare during limited war and general war as directed by USCINCEUR.
2. (TS) GENERAL.
 - a. During peacetime COMSOTFE conducts and coordinates unconventional warfare operational planning for the USCINCEUR area of coordinating responsibility. On or before the outbreak of hostilities, SOTFE will become operational and will have the primary responsibility of conducting UW operations in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.
 - b. The fundamental strategy of UW operations conducted by COMSOTFE is to support SACEUR/USCINCEUR military operations by exploiting the resistance potential in areas dominated, or likely to be overrun, by enemy forces. The UW objectives are to:
 - (1) Interdict, harass or destroy enemy communications, transportation and supply systems, installations and facilities.
 - (2) Cause strategic and tactical dispersal or concentration of enemy forces by means of the above.
 - (3) Provide the means for United States and Allied military personnel, military personnel of other friendly nations, and other selected individuals, to remain free and to escape from unfriendly territory.
 - (4) Create and strengthen active and passive resistance to hostile authority.
 - (5) Obtain intelligence information.
 - (6) Assist United States sponsored indigenous leaders in establishing control over Soviet Bloc social and political structures.
 - (7) Assist USCINCEUR/SACEUR in the establishment of military governments in appropriate areas.
3. (TS) INITIAL UW OPERATIONS.
 - a. On or before the outbreak of hostilities, SOTFE will be activated as

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

COPY OF COPIES
This Annex consists of 3 pages

TOP SECRET

Annex A to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

an operational joint task force and the headquarters will relocate, when appropriate, to Lariboisiere Caserne (Fontainebleau), France.

b. CINCUSAREUR will establish a SFOB at Orleans, France; move the 10th SFGA thereto; and assemble troops and equipment required for the support of UW. COMCLAEUR will activate a SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group; alert selected in-place assets and assemble appropriate external assets. USNAVEUR naval units and USAFE air units will participate in SOTFE UW operations as directed. COMSOTFE will assume operational control of attached forces.

c. Initially, UW operations will be conducted by in-place clandestine assets, stay-behind indigenous forces, and stay-behind SFODs. The objective will be to generate resistance groups and to influence and guide their operations to support military operations by retarding the initial enemy offensive and to obtain intelligence for subsequent operations.

d. Activities conducted by indigenous UW elements will be characterized initially by their clandestine nature and by the fact that many of these operations will be conducted in urban areas. Included in these activities are the following: sabotage, covert propaganda; infiltration into enemy installations; planned civil disobedience or non-cooperation; and formation of groups as action nuclei for future guerrilla organizations.

e. As the situation permits, following the outbreak of hostilities, SFOD's and/or other appropriate UW units, assisted by assets furnished by CIA, will be infiltrated into selected UW operational areas to generate, organize and equip resistance groups and to influence and guide their operations.

4. (TS) FOLLOW-ON UW OPERATIONS.

UW operations underway will be continued. Considering the results of initial UW operations and the developing situation, COMSOTFE will direct expansion of UW. Deployment of additional UW forces and expansion of operations will be undertaken to:

- (1) Step up the disruption and retardation of enemy efforts to reorganize.
- (2) Cause the enemy to divert to rear areas the maximum of combat troops.
- (3) Provide maximum UW support to conventional operations.

5. (TS) DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

National policy will provide the political objectives for UW operations. The

TOP SECRET

Annex A to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

political significance of UW can be expected to expand progressively during the course of war. Political implications of UW may surpass its military significance in certain situations such as the imminent liberation from enemy control of a particular country or in the closing days of the war when victory is imminent. COMSOTFE will determine and issue guidance on political matters for elements of SOTFE.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

O.P. 10-1:

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex P to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. (S) PURPOSE.

This annex sets forth command relationships for the conduct of UW within USCINCEUR's area of coordination responsibility.

2. (TS) GENERAL.

a. On order from USCINCEUR, SOTFE will be activated as an operational joint task force. Headquarters, SOTFE, maintained in peacetime as a planning headquarters, will be augmented in accordance with the JCS approved wartime TD. The 10th SFCA will be attached to COMSOTFE for operational control, as will a SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group from CIA-EUR.

b. COMSOTFE conducts UW initially through exercise of operational control of Army and CIA units attached for that purpose. USAFE and USNAVEUR units operate in support of UW. Subsequently, as required, USAFE and USNAVEUR units are attached to COMSOTFE for operational control.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

APPENDIX:


Command Relationship Diagram

OFFICIAL:

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3 Division

TOP SECRET

Appendix 1 to Annex B, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM



LEGEND

- _____ Command
- OPN Command
- OPN Control
- o-o-o-o-o- ADM Control
- Coordination

- (1) COMCJAEUR attaches the SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group to COMSOTFE for operational control on D-Day or sooner as directed by USCINCEUR.
- (2) CINCUSAREUR attaches the 10th SFGA to COMSOTFE for operational control on D-Day or sooner as directed by USCINCEUR. CINCUSAREUR may designate other forces to support UW operations.
- (3) CINCUSNAVEUR designates Naval units to support specific requirements for UW operations. When directed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR attaches a Naval element and/or Naval units to COMSOTFE for operational control.
- (4) CINCUSAFE designates Air Force units to support UW. Currently, the 32nd Air Division is designated to provide tactical and logistical air transport for UW operations. When directed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE attaches an element and/or air units to COMSOTFE for operational control.

SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex C to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 INTELLIGENCE

References:

a. Maps:

- (1) AMS Series as appropriate, of scale 1:100,000.
- (2) AMS Series as appropriate, of scale 1:250,000.
- (3) Naval charts, aeronautical charts, and other maps, as appropriate.

b. Policy guidance and information.

- (1) Hq USEUCOM Directives of the 40 Series.
- (2) USCINCEUR OPlans 100-1, 100-2, 100-3, 100-4.
- (3) Hq SOTFE Field SOP.

c. Basic intelligence.

- (1) Current USEUCOM Joint Intelligence Estimate.
- (2) Current USAREUR Intelligence Estimate.
- (3) CIA, National Intelligence Surveys.
- (4) DA, Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas (Georgetown Studies).
- (5) CIA, Geographic Intelligence Reports (Recommended UW Areas).
- (6) CIA, Geographic Intelligence Reports (Evasion Geographies).
- (7) CIA, Intelligence for Special Operations (TAB Studies).
- (8) DA, Special Warfare Area Handbooks.
- (9) DA, Special Operations Research Office Studies (SORO).
- (10) DA, Operations Research Office Studies (ORO).

1. (U) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

a. Summary. See Intelligence estimates, summaries, and reports as made available by USEUCOM and component commands.

b. Basic Intelligence. Reference c.

2. (U) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI).

Appendix 1 (EEI).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200.10.

SECRET

ANNEX C to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 INTELLIGENCE

b. Maps and Charts.

- (1) Basic maps, references a(1) and (2).
- (2) Supplementary maps and charts, reference a(3).
- (3) Assigned, attached or supporting units obtain maps and charts, as required, through own service channels.

c. Counterintelligence.

- (1) Each commander is responsible for the application of necessary measures for the security of classified information, and will take such action as is necessary for the protection of personnel, equipment, and installations within his command, against espionage, sabotage and subversion.
- (2) All counterintelligence information will be reported to COMSOTFE.
- (3) Armed forces censorship, if and when imposed, will be conducted in accordance with provisions of AR 380-200, OPNAVINST 5530.6A, AFR 205-30, and such other instructions as issued by appropriate authority.
- (4) Reference b(3).

d. Reports. Reference b(3).

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

APPENDIX.

1. Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT R. DICKEY III
Major, USMC
Director, J2 Division

SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Appendix 1 to Annex C to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI)

1. (S) Following EEI are general in nature and are directed at Soviet, Soviet Satellite and Soviet-occupied nations in USCINCEUR's area.
 - a. When, where and under what circumstances, including outside sponsorship, are general resistance movements or revolutionary outbreaks likely to occur? How many people may become involved in active resistance? What are their capabilities? What are their probable political orientation and objectives?
 - b. What are the strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, and capabilities of security and/or military forces capable of attempting suppression of resistance movements or revolutionary outbreaks in areas selected under (1) above? What is the likelihood that these forces, or any segments thereof, might defect or conduct themselves ineffectually in a suppression role? Where will these forces exercise greater or less interference with UW operations?
 - c. What is the probable reaction of the population of the nation concerned under the various possible circumstances of a resistance movement or revolutionary outbreak? Is external sponsorship likely to effect their reaction?
 - d. What will be the Soviet reaction and course of action in the event of resistance movement or revolutionary outbreak? Satellite reactions?
 - e. Are there any organized clandestine resistance groups? If so, what and where are they? What is their orientation, affiliations, reliability and potential? Who are the recognized leaders and how can contact be established with them?
 - f. What groups by profession or other category are most likely to resist or revolt? What groups are most responsive to Western psychological operations?
 - g. What opportunities exist for access by resistance groups to arms, munitions, and other military stores?
 - h. What specific items of logistical support would most effectively aid a resistance movement or revolutionary outbreak?
 - i. Where are the most suitable and most likely areas for GW operations? For subversion operations?
 - j. What areas constitute suitable places of refuge for E&E operations?

SECRET

Appendix 1 to Annex C to COMSOTF OPLAN NR 10-1 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI)

(b) Intelligence in the country concerned?

(c) In other Satellite countries and the USSR?

(10) Where, when and how can contact be established?

c. Concerning Soviet and/or Satellite (including nation concerned) military and security forces in or near the area of resistance or revolutionary activity:

(1) What are their strength, composition, equipment, locations, and operational functions?

(2) What actions are they taking and how are they conducting themselves?

(3) What activities or equipment of these forces are most vulnerable to action by resistance elements?

d. What is the Soviet and/or Satellite (including nation concerned) reaction to activities of resistance or revolutionary forces, to include:

(1) Troop movements and activities?

(2) Security forces movements and activities?

(3) Movements of air and naval units?

(4) Political actions and pronouncements?

e. What would be/is the Soviet and/or Satellite (including nation concerned) political and military reaction to:

(1) Logistic assistance by U.S. to resistance/revolutionary forces?

(2) Deployment of U.S. personnel to assist resistance/revolutionary forces?

f. Concerning the area of the resistance movement or revolutionary outbreak:

(1) Do any safe, or relatively safe, land, sea, or air routes exist between territory controlled by the resistance/revolutionary forces and U.S./Allied zones? Are suitable drop zones, helicopter and small plane landing areas, and beach landing sites available, and if so, where?

(2) What specific targets in or near the territory controlled by the

SECRET

Appendix 1 to Annex C to COMSOTF OPLAN NR 10-1
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI)

resistance/revolutionary forces are most vulnerable, feasible, and profitable for UW action? What are the location, approaches, obstacles, and damage or destruction requirements?

g. What conditions exist which can be exploited, in support of UW operations, by means of Psychological operations.

BOSWELL
Colonel, USA

OFFICIAL:

DICKEY

J2

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex D to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AREAS

1. (S) Purpose. This annex lists USCINCEUR's pre-planned UW areas and outlines the conditions and priorities under which activation is planned.
2. (TS) General.
 - a. Designated U.S. Army SFODs will be oriented toward appropriate countries and will develop and maintain plans for the conduct of operations in designated areas.
 - b. Certain UW areas have been selected in neutral and friendly countries to support initial repositioning of conventional forces from the general line now occupied by U.S. or allied forces if required.
 - c. In all UW areas, Evasion and Escape and Subversion activities may be initiated prior to introduction of SFODs. These activities may be expanded or modified as the SFODs are introduced into the area.
 - d. In those UW areas designated E&E/GW, clandestine resistance activities may be conducted concurrently.
3. (TS) Priorities.
 - a. UW areas are listed by priority, based on military requirements in accordance with the planned time-phase of activation.
 - b. Priority I Areas - (D-Day to D+90 Days)
 - c. Priority II Areas - (D+90 Days to D+180 Days)
4. (TS) UW Assets. The CIA will develop and maintain appropriate UW assets as follows:
 - a. Priority I Areas. Assets in these areas will be developed and maintained for utilization by D-Day. The desired support to be provided in each area is an in-place asset with radio communications. The minimum acceptable support is an externally held asset prepared to be infiltrated immediately after D-Day. Externally held assets will normally precede the infiltration of SFODs.
 - b. Priority II Areas. Assets in these areas will be developed and maintained for utilization not later than D+90 days. Support to be provided in each area is the same as for Priority I areas.
5. (TS) Functions of Assets.
 - a. All Assets.

SECRET

Annex D to COMSOTF OPLAN NR 10-1 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AREAS

- (1) Furnish UW intelligence information. (see EEI, Annex C).
- (2) Spot potential resistance leaders.
- (3) On order, initiate organization of local resistance movements or mechanisms.
- (4) Report local capabilities for clandestine UW activities, initiate clandestine activities, and/or conduct UW as directed.
- (5) Render evasion and escape assistance to U.S. and allied personnel.

b. Additional Functions of GW Assets.

- (1) Pending arrival of SFODs, continue development and exploitation of resistance potential.
- (2) Arrange for reception of SFODs to include establishing contact between the detachment commander and potential guerrilla leaders.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

APPENDIX.

1. List of UW Areas

OFFICIAL: [illegible]

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3 Division

TOP SECRET

Appendix I to Annex D Unconventional Warfare Areas COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 LIST OF UW AREAS

1. (TS) UW Areas.

<u>Country</u> <u>Designator</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Assigned</u> <u>Mission</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>East Germany</u>			
EG-1	I	E&E/GW	5320N-1308E
EG-2	I	E&E/GW	5230N-1220E
EG-3	I	E&E/GW	5045N-1310E
EG-4	I	E&E/GW	5150N-1320E
EG-5	I	E&E/GW	5040N-1120E
EG-6	II	E&E/GW	5125N-1120E
<u>Poland</u>			
P-1	I	Subv	5055N-1805E
P-2	I	E&E/GW	4940N-1905E
P-3	I	E&E/GW	4920N-2225E
P-4	I	E&E/GW	5030N-2225E
P-5	I	E&E/GW	5240N-1600E
P-6	I	E&E/GW	5310N-2315E
P-7	II	E&E/GW	5025N-1645E
P-8	II	E&E/GW	5350N-1805E
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>			
C-1	I	E&E/GW	4810N-1340E
C-2	I	E&E/GW	5050N-1510E
C-3	I	E&E/GW	5005N-1720E
C-4	I	E&E/GW	4905N-1910E
C-5	I	E&E/GW	4850N-2025E
C-6	I	E&E/GW	4900N-2140E
<u>Hungary</u>			
H-1	I	E&E/GW	4805N-2030E
H-2	I	E&E/GW	4800N-1815E
<u>Rumania</u>			
R-1	I	E&E/GW	4640N-2255E
R-2	I	E&E/GW	4710N-2456E
R-3	I	E&E/GW	4535N-2450E
R-4	I	E&E/GW	4515N-2250E

TOP SECRET

Appendix 1 to Annex D Unconventional Warfare Areas COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 LIST OF UW AREAS

<u>Country</u> <u>Designator</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Assigned</u> <u>Mission</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Rumania</u>			
R-5	II	E&E/GW	4630N-2605E
R-6	II	E&E/GW	4535N-2615E
<u>Albania</u>			
A-1	I	E&E/GW	4220N-1950E
A-2	I	E&E/GW	4050N-2020E
<u>Bulgaria</u>			
B-1	I	E&E/GW	4200N-2340E
B-2	I	E&E/GW	4300N-2715E
B-3	II	E&E/GW	4250N-2445E
<u>USSR</u>			
SR-1	I	Subv	5445N-2115E
SR-2	I	E&E/GW	5345N-2555E
SR-3	I	E&E/GW	5500N-2330E
SR-4	I	E&E/GW	5105N-2610E
SR-5	I	E&E/GW	4845N-2310E
SR-6	I	E&E/GW	5825N-2510E
SR-7	I	E&E/GW	6910N-3210E
SR-8	I	E&E/GW	4440N-3850E
SR-9	I	E&E/GW	4325N-4110E
SR-10	I	Subv	4055N-4845E
SR-11	I	E&E/GW	4250N-4645E
SR-12	II	E&E/GW	6500N-4145E
SR-13	II	E&E/GW	5500N-3300E
SR-14	II	E&E/GW	4150N-4225E
SR-15	II	E&E/GW	4020N-4630E
SR-16	II	Subv	4230N-4505E
SR-17	II	Subv	5040N-3040E
SR-18	II	Subv	4810N-2615E
SR-19	II	E&E/GW	5910N-2700E
SR-20	II	E&E/GW	5720N-2730E
<u>Yugoslavia (If occupied by enemy forces)</u>			
Y-1	I	E&E/GW	4620N-1450E

TOP SECRET

Appendix 1 to Annex D Unconventional Warfare Areas CONSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 LIST OF UW AREAS

<u>Country</u> <u>Designator</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Assigned</u> <u>Mission</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Yugoslavia</u>			
Y-2	I	E&E/GW	4320N-2115E
Y-3	II	E&E/GW	4352N-1830E
<u>Finland</u>			
F-1	I	E&E/GW	6050N-2735E
F-2	I	E&E/GW	6435N-2800E
F-3	II	E&E/GW	6250N-3030E
<u>Austria</u>			
AU-1	I	E&E/GW	4710N-1125E
AU-2	I	E&E/GW	4745N-1345E
AU-3	I	E&E/GW	4710N-1505E
AU-4	II	E&E/GW	4740N-1555E
<u>Sweden</u>			
SW-1	I	E&E/GW	5845N-1430E
SW-2	I	E&E/GW	6005N-1705E
SW-3	I	E&E/GW	5805N-1545E
SW-4	I	E&E/GW	5830N-1140E
SW-5	II	E&E/GW	6020N-1410E
<u>Norway</u>			
N-1	I	E&E/GW	7005N-2410E
<u>Norway</u>			
N-2	I	E&E/GW	5840N-0720E
N-3	I	E&E/GW	6030N-1050E
N-4	I	E&E/GW	6840N-1800E
<u>France</u>			
F-1	I	E&E/GW	4925N-0330E
F-2	I	E&E/GW	4850N-0540E
F-3	I	E&E/GW	4845N-0720E
F-4	I	E&E/GW	4800N-0445E
F-5	I	E&E/GW	4745N-0455E
F-6	I	E&E/GW	4615N-0535E
F-7	I	E&E/GW	4520N-0240E
F-8	I	E&E/GW	4505N-0415E

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Appendix I to Annex D Unconventional Warfare Areas

COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1

LIST OF UW AREAS

Country Designator	Priority	Assigned Mission	Location
<u>France</u>			
F-0	I	E&E/GW	4420N-0535E
<u>Italy</u>			
I-1	I	E&E/GW	1630N-1110E
I-2	I	E&E/GW	4620N-1205E
<u>Italy</u>			
I-3	I	E&E/GW	4535N-1110E
I-4	I	E&E/GW	4515N-0720E
I-5	I	E&E/GW	4405N-1020E
<u>Greece</u>			
G-1	I	E&E/GW	4005N-2100E
G-2	I	E&E/GW	4115N-2355E
<u>Turkey</u>			
T-1	I	Subv	4140N-2740E
T-2	I	E&E/GW	4110N-4130E
T-3	I	E&E/GW	3945N-4220E
<u>West Germany</u>			
WG-1	I	E&E/GW	5110N-0750E
WG-2	I	E&E/GW	5005N-0710E
WG-3	I	E&E/GW	4840N-0830E
WG-4	I	E&E/GW	4915N-0750E
<u>Switzerland</u>			
S-1	I	E&E/GW	4715N-0915E
S-2	I	E&E/GW	4715N-0725E
<u>Luxembourg</u>			
L-1	I	E&E/GW	4945N-0600E
<u>Netherlands</u>			
NE-1	I	E&E/GW	5220N-0610E
<u>Belgium</u>			
BE-1	I	E&E/GW	5030N-0400E
<u>Denmark</u>			
D-1	I	E&E/GW	5625N-0825E

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex E to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
UW FORCES

1. (C) **PURPOSE.** This annex provides:
 - a. A list of forces available for the purpose of conducting UW in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.
 - b. An estimate of indigenous forces to be generated for guerrilla warfare.
2. (TS) **USCINCEUR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES.**
 - a. **U.S. Army SFOD's in Europe.**

Area Orientation	Type Detachment			TOTAL
	A	B	C	
East Germany	4		1	5
Poland	2		1	3
Czechoslovakia	2	1		3
Austria	2	1		3
Hungary	1	1		2
Yugoslavia	1	1		2
Rumania	1	1		2
Bulgaria	1	1		2
USSR	4		1	5
Albania	1			1
Finland	1			1
Sweden	1			1
Norway	1			1
Italy	1			1
Turkey	2			2
Greece	1			1
TOTAL	26		3	35

(Note: There are 6 Detachments "A" in the Berlin Command to be assigned to the 10th SFGA upon completion of missions assigned by USCOB. They are not included in the above totals.

- b. **U.S. Air Force Units.** Provided by CINCUSAFE.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD D/R 5200.10

TOP SECRET

Annex E to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 UW FORCES

c. U.S. Naval Units. SEAL units and other forces provided by CINCPAC-USNAVEUR.

d. CIA Forces.

(1) SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group assigned to COMSOTFE when directed.

(2) Assets required by COMSOTFE for UW operations assigned to the SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group by COMCIAEUR.

3. (TS) INDIGENOUS FORCES.

a. General. Indigenous force estimates are based on the criteria that in each active guerrilla warfare area a total of 1,500 indigenous personnel will be generated. The rate of generation will vary in each area. The following criteria is used to provide a basis for operational and logistical planning. Each active GW area will generate:

(1) 500 indigenous personnel in 30 days.

(2) 1,000 indigenous personnel in 60 days.

(3) 1,500 indigenous personnel in 90 days.

b. Force Estimate.

(1) Indigenous force estimate for areas in Soviet satellite areas, and USSR, neutral countries if occupied, and initial re-positioning areas, in support of USCINCEUR OPLAN NR EC 102.

Country	D+30	D+60	D+90	D+120	D+150	D+180
Albania		1000	2000	3000	3000	3000
Bulgaria	1000	2000	3000	3500	4000	4500
Czechoslovakia	1500	4000	6500	7500	7500	7500
E. Germany	2000	4500	7000	8500	9500	10500
Hungary	500	1500	2500	3000	3000	3000
Poland	1500	3000	5000	6000	7000	7500
Rumania	1500	3000	5000	6500	8000	9000
USSR	1500	4500	9000	13500	19000	23500
Yugoslavia	500	1500	2500	4000	5000	6000
Austria	1500	3000	4500	5000	5500	6000
Finland	500	1000	2000	3000	4000	4500
Sweden	500	1000	3500	5500	7500	7500
Italy		500	1500	2500	3000	3500
Greece	500	1000	2500	4000	5500	6000
Turkey	1000	2000	4000	5500	7000	7500
Norway		500	1500	2500	3000	3000
TOTAL:	14,000	34,000	63,000	83,500	101,500	112,500

TOP SECRET

Annex E to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
LW FORCES

(2) Indigenous forces estimates for areas in friendly or neutral countries in support of USCINCEUR OPLAN NR EC-104

	D+120 days	D+150 days	D+180 days			
W. Germany	3000	4000	6000			
Norway	1500	3000	4500			
Italy	1000	2000	3000			
Netherlands	500	1000	1500			
Belgium	500	1000	1500			
Denmark	500	1000	1500			
Luxembourg	500	1000	1500			
Switzerland	1000	2000	3000			
France	2500	5000	7500			
TOTAL: (par 3b(2))	10,000	20,000	30,000			
AGGREGATE TOTAL:	14,000	34,000	62,000	93,500	121,500	142,500

CHARLES B. ROSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3

Appendix 1 to Annex 1, Air Operations
COMSOTEE OPLAN NR 10 1
PRE PLANNED AIR SUPPORT

INSTRUMENTS, D-DAY - D+60

Headquarter
SUPPORT OPERATION
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

TIME	USAFE MISSION NR	Priority		Type Mission	Passengers		Cargo			Loading Point	Country	Coordinates	(read)		Applicable Footnotes
		By Country	In Order		Number	Wt in Lbs	Weight		Nr Pkgs & Cube				Down	Up	
							Tons	MT							
	101	1	1	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	Evreux	B	4200N 2340E	129	-	a
	102	2	2	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	B	4300N 2715E	130	-	a
	103	1	3	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	C	4910N 1340E	131	-	a
	104	2	4	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	C	5050N 1510E	132	-	a
	105	3	5	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	C	5005N 1720E	133	-	a
	106	1	6	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	EG	5320N 1308E	134	-	a
	107	2	7	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	EG	5230N 1320E	135	-	a
	108	3	8	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	EG	5045N 1310E	136	-	a
	109	4	9	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	EG	5150N 1320E	137	-	a
	110	1	10	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	H	4805N 2030E	138	-	a
	111	1	11	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	P	4940N 1905E	139	-	a
	112	2	12	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	P	4920N 2225E	140	-	a
	113	3	13	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	P	5030N 2225E	141	-	a
	114	1	14	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	R	4640N 2255E	142	-	a
	115	2	15	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	R	4710N 2456E	143	-	a
	116	3	16	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	R	4535N 2450E	144	-	a
	117	1	17	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	SR	5345N 2555E	145	-	a
	118	2	18	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	SR	5500N 2330E	146	-	a
	119	3	19	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	SR	5105N 2610E	147	-	a
	120	1	20	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	Y	4620N 1450E	148	-	a
	121	1	21	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	AU	4710N 1125E	149	-	a
	122	2	22	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	AU	4745N 1345E	150	-	a
	123	3	23	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	AU	4710N 1505E	151	-	a
	124	1	24	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	FI	6050N 2735E	152	-	a
	125	1	25	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	SW	5645N 1430E	153	-	a
	126	1	26	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	G	4005N 2100E	154	-	a
	127	1	27	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	T	4110N 4130E	155	-	a
	128	2	28	A/D	12	3120	.75	1.5	3-20	"	T	3945N 4220E	156	-	a

TOP SECRET

D-Day - 14-10

D-Day - 1410

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Appendix 2 to Annex 1, Air Operations
COMSOPF OPLAN NR 10-1
AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS D+60 to D+180

DEST COUNTRY	D+60 to D+75			D+75 to D+90			D+90 to D+105			D+105 to D+120		
	PSGRS	SOR- TIES	TONS	PSGRS	SOR- TIES	TONS	PSGRS	SOR- TIES	TONS	PSGRS	SOR- TIES	TONS
A	0	4	17.5	0	2	16	0	0	0	0	8	48
B	0	4	32.0	0	4	32	0	4	32	0	4	32
C	0	10	65.5	0	8	64	0	8	48	0	12	96
EG	0	9	64.75	0	10	80	0	9	72	0	10	80
H	0	2	16.75	0	4	32	0	3	24	0	4	32
P	0	6	48.0	0	6	48	12	7	48.75	0	9	72.75
R	0	6	48.0	0	6	48	12	7	48.75	0	9	72.75
SR	0	9	50.25	0	12	96	36	15	98.25	0	18	144.00
Y	0	3	16.75	0	4	32	0	3	24.0	0	4	32
AU	0	6	48.0	0	6	48	0	6	48	0	6	48
FI	0	2	16.0	0	2	16	12	3	16.75	0	8	32.75
SW	0	2	16.0	0	2	16	48	6	19.0	0	14	56.0
I	0	2	8.75	0	1	8	12	1	7.75	0	6	40.75
G	0	2	16.0	0	2	16	24	4	17.5	0	8	49.5
T	0	4	32.0	0	4	32	24	6	33.5	0	10	65.5
N	0	2	8.75	0	1	8	12	1	7.75	0	6	40.75
Totals	0	74	505.0	0	74	592	192	81	532.00	0	131	948.0

Country Legend:

A - Albania	Y - Yugoslavia
B - Bulgaria	AU - Austria
C - Czechoslovakia	FI - Finland
EG - East Germany	SW - Sweden
H - Hungary	I - Italy
P - Poland	G - Greece
R - Rumania	T - Turkey
SR - Soviet Russia	N - Norway

THIS APPENDIX CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TAG. FORCE EUROPE
APO 183, US Forces

Annex J to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. U.S. unconventional warfare forces attached to COMSOTFE will utilize nuclear munitions, as directed, in support of the wartime missions and tasks of SACEUR/USCINCEUR's land, naval and air forces.

b. Assumption.

National policy will permit, during time of war, the use of indigenous personnel to assist in the arming, employment and firing of nuclear weapons. This does not include use of indigenous personnel during peacetime.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) CINCUSAREUR.

(a) Provides special weapons logistic support to COMSOTFE in the conduct of UW, to include the receipt, storage, maintenance, surveillance, security and modification of ADMs and associated equipment earmarked for use by UW forces.

(b) Releases atomic demolitions munitions to COMSOTFE as directed by USCINCEUR.

(c) Provides necessary transportation together with nuclear courier team as required for movement of ADMs from storage sites to departure points designated by COMSOTFE.

(2) CINCUSAFE.

(a) Provides special weapons logistic support to COMSOTFE on an emergency basis.

(b) Provides aircraft and special weapons-trained liaison personnel and/or nuclear courier teams as required for movement of ADMs from storage sites to departure points and from departure points conducts tactical air transport missions to operational areas.

(c) Provides as required, appropriate temporary storage and security for ADMs at departure airfields.

(3) CINCUSNAVEUR.

(a) Provides special weapons logistic support to COMSOTFE on an emergency basis.

(b) Provides surface, submarine and/or airlift, together with special

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

TOP SECRET

Annex J to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

weapons-trained liaison personnel and/or nuclear courier team as required for movement of ADMs from storage sites to departure points and from departure points to operational areas.

(c) Provides as required, appropriate temporary storage and security for ADMs at departure points.

(4) COMCIAEUR. Provides CIA support to COMSOTFE for the employment of ADMs in UW as directed by USCINCEUR.

2. (TS) MISSION. Employ ADMs in the conduct of unconventional warfare.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Upon implementation of UW plans, UW forces will employ ADMs as directed by USCINCEUR. The utilization of ADMs provides as additional capability to execute assigned tasks and does not alter the basic concepts governing the conduct of UW.

(2) USCINCEUR/SACEUR provides to COMSOTFE a portion of the allocated nuclear weapons in the SACEUR reserve for unconventional warfare operations. When USCINCEUR directs the release of an ADM to COMSOTFE, the authority to employ is automatic.

(3) Specific targets for ADMs will be designated as the situation and operational requirements dictate. Priorities of targets for ADMs are as follows:

- (a) Enemy nuclear delivery capability.
- (b) Enemy transportation systems.
- (c) Enemy communications systems.
- (d) Enemy supply systems, facilities and structures.

(4) Deployed Special Forces Detachments perform target acquisition and submit target data and recommendations to the SFOB. When appropriate, this information with recommendations of the CO, 10th SFGA is relayed to COMSOTFE. COMSOTFE analyses target attack requests, effects necessary coordination. And, when appropriate, directs the employment of ADM(s).

(5) 10th SFGA courier personnel rig, with parachute rigger assistance, ADM for aerial delivery when infiltration is by air, infiltrate with components into designated operational area, accompany emplacement team to target site and assist in ADM emplacement and detonation. Courier personnel maintain capability of emergency destruction of ADM utilizing approved methods.

b. 10th SFGA.

(1) Plan for and conduct on order ADM operations, to include emplacement and detonation of weapon within UW operational area.

(2) Provide nuclear courier teams for delivery of ADM from departure point to UW operational area.

4. (U) LOGISTICS. Annex G.

TOP SECRET

**Annex J to COMSOTVE OPLAN NR 10-1
EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Command - - - - - Annex B.**
- b. Communications - - Annex F.**

CHARLES J. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex K to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1
EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. General. This annex provides guidance for the employment of chemical and biological (CB) munitions by UW forces.

b. Enemy Forces. Annex C: Intelligence.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) CINCUSAREUR.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include providing munitions at time and place designated by COMSOTFE.

(b) Renders technical assistance when required.

(2) CINCUSNAVEUR.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include logistical and service support at USNAVEUR departure point.

(b) Provides delivery means for movement of CB munitions from departure point to the operational area.

(3) CINCUSAF.

(a) Supports SOTFE CB operations to include logistical and service support at USAFE departure point.

(b) Provides delivery means for movement of CB munitions from departure point to the operational area.

2. (TS) MISSION. Employ chemical and biological munitions in support of unconventional warfare.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) General. Specific targets for the employment of chemical

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10.

TOP SECRET

Annex K to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS

and biological munitions, which includes defoliants, herbicides, and anti-crop agents, will be designated as the situation and operational requirements dictate.

(2) UW forces submit target requests to COMSOTFE for CB munitions. Requests will contain pertinent data as to location, time, circumstances of and justification for employment.

(3) COMSOTFE analyzes target requests in light of USCINCEUR's operational plans. If requests are approved, COMSOTFE coordinates details of delivery of CB munitions to operational area.

(4) When directed by COMSOTFE, CB munitions and training assistance may be extended to guerrilla and indigenous forces. The employment of CB munitions, where practicable, will be supervised by trained and qualified U.S. personnel to insure that the employment is restricted to the minimum essential for military requirements.

b. 10th Special Forces Group (Abn).

(1) Plans for and conducts CB operations on order.

(2) When directed, train, advise and supervise guerrilla and indigenous forces in the employment of CB munitions.

(3) Provides qualified personnel authorized to inventory and receipt for allocated CB munitions at storage or designated departure point.

c. SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group. Provides intelligence support and assets in connection with employment of CB munitions in selected UW operational areas.

4. (U) LOGISTICS. Annex G.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command: Annex B.

b. Signal: Annex F.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

K-2

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

Headquarters
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE EUROPE
APO 163, US Forces

Annex L to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (S) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex C, Intelligence.
- b. Friendly Forces

(1) United States Information Agency (USIA) conducts U.S. overt information programs in areas other than active military theaters of operations as directed by national authority.

(2) USCINCEUR, CINCLANT AND CINCSAC conduct psychological operations as appropriate to support U.S. and Allied objectives and their military operations.

(3) CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE and COMCINCPAC conduct and support psychological warfare operations as directed by USCINCEUR.

- c. Definitions.

(1) Psychological Operations: includes psychological warfare and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

(2) Psychological Warfare: the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

2. (S) MISSION. Conduct psychological operations in support of unconventional warfare operations.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations.

Unconventional warfare operations will be initiated in time of war when there are some areas in the Soviet Bloc in which a segment of the indigenous population is susceptible to development of a resistance movement by U.S. military personnel or personnel responsive to U.S. control. The creation of this favorable atmosphere will depend to a great extent upon the degree of success achieved by psychological operations planned, coordinated and conducted by USCINCEUR. Those aspects of psychological operations which support UW are designed to:

- (a) Convince the people of Soviet Bloc nations of the inevitability of U.S. and Allied military victory.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

Annex L to COMSOTFE OPLAN NR 10-1 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(b) Condition the people of Soviet Bloc nations to believe that to accept and to support U.S. Special Forces personnel in action in furtherance of their own idealistic and nationalistic aspirations.

(c) Prompt the people of Soviet Bloc nations to take active measures in opposition to control by Soviet and Soviet Bloc dominated governments. Such opposition should be channeled into forms of guerrilla warfare, subversion, formation of dissident groups, etc.

(1) USCINCEUR provides COMSOTFE with psychological operations policy and guidance and coordinates psychological operations. (Hq USEUCOM Directive Nr 55-1, 11 May 60.)

(2) COMSOTFE submits psychological operations requirements to USCINCEUR.

(3) COMSOTFE supports USCINCEUR's psychological operations effort by conducting psychological operations in UW areas in which COMSOTFE UW forces are operating. COMSOTFE psychological operations, therefore, are conducted in enemy controlled or dominated territory where some degree of psychological operations success has previously been achieved. The presence of U.S. Special Forces within enemy controlled/dominated territory is in itself a potent factor contributing to the achievement of USCINCEUR psychological operations objectives.

b. 10th Special Forces Group (Abr). Conduct psychological operations as directed.

c. SOTFE (CIA) Liaison Group.

(1) Conduct psychological operations as directed.

(2) Keep COMSOTFE advised of COMCIAEUR psychological operations which may affect SOTFE operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Psychological operations in support of UW will conform to policy guidance directives issued by COMSOTFE.

(2) Submit psychological operations requirements in support of this plan to COMSOTFE.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

Administrative and logistic support for psychological operations are provided by the parent organizations of assigned or attached units.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command Relationships - Annex B.

SECRET

Annex L to COMBOTE OPLAN NR 10-1 **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**


b - Communications and Electronics - Annex F.

CHARLES B. BOSWELL
Colonel, USA
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

ROYAL R. TAYLOR
Colonel, USA
Director, J3

NUCLEAR



YIELD

REQUIREMENTS

VOLUME I

CONTAINS PAGES 1 THRU 146

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 53010

REPRODUCTION IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT
WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

Published under the direction of Deputy Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Hq. USAF, by the
497th Recon Tech Squadron

CONTROL NO.

COPY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
The Information Commission: This Document Will Not Be Disclosed to Foreign Nationals or Their Representatives

TOP SECRET

PART

I

TARGET

LISTING


NUMERICAL

BY SACEUR NO.

TOP SECRET

NUCLEAR YIELD REQUIREMENTS MANUAL

FOREWORD



I. INTRODUCTION

The NUCLEAR YIELD REQUIREMENTS MANUAL contains a list of targets for which the probability of damage to each target has been computed for six Circular Probable Errors (CEP), and specific heights of burst. The probabilities of damage are computed for USAFE Theater stockpiled weapons as well as other yields. The DGZ information is based on confirmed intelligence and target graphics suitable for a weapons analysts.

There are three major parts to the NYR contained in two volumes.

Volume I -

Part I - Target listing, numerical by SACEUR No.

Part II - Desired Ground Zero (DGZ) Information, numerical by SACEUR No.

Volume II -

Part III - Target Damage Probabilities, numerical by SACEUR No.

This Manual will be published quarterly for the purpose of incorporating latest revisions and corrections.

II. METHODOLOGY

A. Analysis of Target

1. To determine the optimum positioning of the DGZ for various weapons, two factors are of major importance. These are to determine the selected target components, and to establish the damage criteria.

a. Selected Target Components. This is defined as that portion of a target which has been selected as the key component of the installation, and/or is essential to the operation of the facility. Damage or destruction to this component most nearly assures mission success. It may or may not encompass the entire target area. An installation may contain more than one component.

b. Damage Criteria. This describes the level and type of damage which is associated with each of the applicable VN's that appear in Part I of this manual, and represents the predicted damage which the selected component will incur. This damage is sufficient to establish mission success.

CONFIDENTIAL

Category	Tgt Component	Type Burst	DGZ Location	Predicted Damage
A. Airfield	Parked Aircraft and above ground facilities.	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	1. For hard surfaces the DGZ will be the center of the longest runway. When runways are intersecting and of equal operational significance, the DGZ may not always correspond to exact center. 2. Natural surface center of max run.	Severe damage: severe structural failure. Requires extensive depot level repairs and include damage beyond repair. Severe structural damage to above ground facilities within the effective area of the weapon radius, and personal casualties, as well as fallout effects.
		Contact (U) (O' HOB)	Single average pt based on dispersal of parked acft	Same as above
		Air (A) (900' scaled HOB)	Same as Contact (U)	Same as above w/exception of fallout effects.
"B & D" Railway and Highway Bridges	Bridge structures except concrete arch concrete heavy haunched concrete haunched, and masonry arch.	Air (A) (300' scaled HOB)	Center of overall length of bridge or center of most vulnerable spans.	For "P" (overpressure) types: severe cracking, rupture at crown of arch, and some displacement; For "Q" (dynamic pressure) types, failure by displacement, sliding off supports and serious cracking.
	All bridge types	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Same as above	Same as above. Additional effect of residual contamination.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Category	Tgt Component	Type Burst	DGZ Location	Predicted Damage
"C" Rail Facilities	Rolling stock	Contact (C) (0' HOB)	Center of widest trackage area.	Severe damage requiring replacement with possible exception of the trucks. Contents generally damaged beyond salvage point except heavy iron castings, or the like, and some fallout effects.
	Rolling stock	Air (A) (640' scaled HOB)	Single average point based on location of rolling stock to maximize blast damage.	Severe damage requiring replacement, with possible exception of trucks. Contents generally damaged beyond salvage point.
"E" Hq and Camps	Above ground buildings.	Air (A) (640' scaled HOB) Contact (C) (0' HOB)	Single average point based on location of buildings.	Severe structural damage to MS/WB buildings. Requires extensive repair before usable for any purpose. Severe damage to contents and to above ground facilities. Precludes operations until major repair or replacement is effected.
"F" Troop Concentrations. <u>Note:</u> On all "F" targets not annotated on Target Material, the probabilities of damage computations are based on a 10,000' radius measured from the DGZ.	Personnel & Structures	Contact (C) (0' HOB)	Center of troop concentration	Structural damage to buildings and dwellings, causing casualties due to blast effect, initial radiation. Bonus damage to material, equipment and supplies.
		Air (A) (640' scaled HOB)	Center of troop concentration	Same as above

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Category	Target Component	Type Burst	DGZ Location	Predicted Damage
"O" & "S" Ammo & Special Weapons Storage Sites	Above ground buildings and/or ordnance concrete igloos.	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Single average point, based on location of storage structures	Severe structural damage to buildings and contents. Igloo arch will be forcefully collapsed.
	Same as above	HOB dependent upon applicable VV	Same as above	Same as above
"M" Waterways	Locks & Dams	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Center of equivalent target area, page I-23 AFM 200-8.	Dam cracked & breached, locks obstructed and gates ruptured plus radiological effects.
"N" Port Areas	Shipsays, berthing and wharf areas.	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Major berthing area to maximize damage to harbor facilities and fitting out areas.	Severe structural damage to harbor facilities, distortion of runways of overhead cranes, overturn gantry cranes. Damage to cruisers or small ships in berthing area requiring extensive repairs; prevents military use of ships.
		Air (A) (640' scaled HOB)	Same as above	Same as above

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Category	Tgt Component	Type Burst	DGZ Location	Predicted Damage
"R" Highway Intersections Note: Probabilities of damage computations are based on a 500' distance measured from the DGZ.	Buildings and Structures	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Center of Intersection	Maximum blast to surrounding buildings or other structures to create rubble & debris which will block the road intersections. (Bonus of cratering and contamination.)
	Same as above	Air (A) (640' Scaled HOB)	Same as above	Same as above except no bonus of cratering and residual contamination.
1 Missile Sites	Missiles in launch condition	Contact (C) (O' HOB)	Center of missile launch site	Missile overturned and destroyed. For missiles in protective sites. Construction of floors and severe damage to missile due to ground shock.
	Same as above	HOB dependent upon appl VN	Same as above	Missile overturned and destroyed. For SAM Sites, damage to missile requiring depot repair.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Bridge Targets.

a. The equivalent target area (ETA) concept is used to compute the probability of collapsing at least one span of a bridge. The ETA is a rectangular area about the center of the bridge and the dimensions are based on AFM 200-8, involving length, width, and vulnerability. The vulnerability of the bridge is dependent upon the type which most nearly describes the construction of the principal structural members or spans. In some instances a bridge was categorized and identified as a combination highway and railroad bridge (BD), but was listed in the manual as one bridge. In this case the least vulnerable type, either B or D, was used for DGZ selection and analysis.

D. Explanatory Notes for Abbreviated Column Entries

1. Country Code. This is the same as that used in the Target Data Inventory (TDI).

2. Type. Refers to airfields and bridges, type of construction.

a. Airfield Types. Runway surfaces are categorized by the code "P", "T", or "N", and are followed by a number indicating type as listed below:

1)P - Permanent:

1. - Concrete

2. - Asphalt or tar-mac.

3. - Concrete ends, center asphalt or tar-mac.

4. - Brick (mortared)

5. - Coral (maintained)

Blank - Unknown

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Minimum Character Grid represents the grid reading from the applicable Target Graphic.

5. Spheroids

INT - International

CLK - Clark

BES - Bessel

6. PV Analysis Reference represents the target material from which the DGZ coordinates are extracted, and does not necessarily represent the source on which the PV analysis is based.

7. Datum

E - European

P - Pulkovo

8. Type Bursts. For all targets, insofar as weapons effects are concerned, only two types of bursts are employed: the air burst (A), and the surface burst (indicated as Contact (C)). To reflect as many possible situations covering the entire range of analysis, additional bursts were located and it was necessary to use additional letters to designate these. The following burst designations by target category in Parts II and III are used:

a. Standard analysis by category.

1) Airfields:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst (center of runway)

U - Optimum Contact Burst (when center of runway was not optimum point for overall damage).

2) Bridges:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

3) Rail Facilities:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4) Air Control Centers and Headquarters & Camps:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

5) Ports:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

6) Waterways:

C - Contact Burst

7) Missile Sites:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

8) Highway Intersections:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

9) Troop Concentrations:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

10) Ammo and Special Weapons Storage Sites:

A - Air Burst

C - Contact Burst

b. Remote Areas. For any targets having remote areas such as dispersal areas, etc., that are an integral part of the target but removed from the major part, additional bursts were used and are designated as follows:

J - Air Burst

K - Contact Burst

c. All Targets. For targets requiring an additional contact burst, K has been used and designated as a second contact burst. This burst is primarily reflected in a few instances for airfields having multiple runways of operational significance (3000 or more) and ports because of relative large size.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY CODES

Alphabetical

AD - Aden, Khamran & Perim Is	FN - French India
AF - Afghanistan	SF - French Somaliland
AL - ALBANIA	FW - French West Africa
AG - Algeria	GA - Gambia
AN - Andorra	GE - GERMANY, EAST
AO - Angola, incl. Cabinda	GW - GERMANY, WEST
AS - Australian New Guinea	GH - Ghana (Gold Coast)
AU - AUSTRIA	GI - Gibraltar
AZ - Azores Islands	GO - Gotland Islands
BA - Bahrain Island	GR - GREECE
BI - Balearic Islands	HK - Hong Kong
BC - Belgian Congo, incl. Ruanda- Urundi Trust Terr.	HU - HUNGARY
BE - Belgium	IL - Iceland
BH - Bornholm Island	IN - India
BU - BULGARIA	VN - Indo-China
BM - Burma	ID - Indonesia
CM - Cameroun (French Trust Terr.)	IR - Iran
CA - Canary Islands	IQ - Iraq
CV - Cape Verde Islands	IS - Israel and Jerusalem
CE - Ceylon and Maldiva Islands	IT - ITALY
CH - China	JA - Japa.
CR - Crete	JO - Jordan
CY - Cyprus	KE - Kenya
CZ - CZECHOSLOVAKIA	KN - Korea, North
DE - Denmark	KS - Korea, South
DO - Dodecanese Islands & Rhodes	KU - Kuwait, Muscat, Oman
EG - Egypt	Qatar, Trucial Oman & Neutral Zones
ER - Eritrea	LE - Lebanon
ET - Ethiopia (Abyssinia)	LI - Liberia
FI - FINLAND	LY - Libya
FR - France	LS - Liechtenstein
FE - French Equatorial Africa (Cavon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari & Chad)	LX - Luxembourg

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY CODES (CONT.)

MA - Madagascar, incl. Comoros and Mayotte Islands	PG - Portuguese India
MD - Madeira Islands	RU - RUMANIA
MF - Malay Fed. and Singapore	BO - Sarawak
ML - Malta	SD - Sardinia
MN - Monaco	SA - Saudi Arabia
MO - Morocco, incl. Intl. Zone of Tangier	SI - Sicily and Pantelleria
MZ - Mozambique (Portuguese E. Africa)	SL - Sierra Leone
NE - NETHERLANDS	SR - Southern Rhodesia
NG - Netherlands Territory in the East Indies, not incl. Indonesia	SP - Spain
NC - New Caledonia	SU - Sudan, Republic of the
NI - Nigeria and Cameroons (British Trust Terr.)	SV - Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
NO - North Borneo	SW - Sweden
NR - Northern Rhodesia	SZ - Switzerland
NO - NORWAY	SY - Syria
PK - Pakistan	TW - Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (Pescadores)
PI - Philippine Islands	TA - Tanganyika Territory
PO - POLAND	TH - Thailand
PT - Portugal	TU - Tunisia
	TK - TURKEY
	UA - Union of South Africa
	UR - U. S. S. R.
	YU - YUGOSLAVIA

5400	5800	5200	5100
1020	5000	5020	5500
110	600	600	1020
0	0	0	0
540	580	400	410
540	580	400	410

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SPECIAL NOTES:

A few targets appearing in Sections A and Section A1 of Part I do not have physical vulnerability information in Parts II and III. This is due to lack of intelligence and/or adequate target materials. As this information becomes available, these targets will be analyzed and included in subsequent revisions of the NTR.

SCALED HOB TO ACTUAL HOB CHART

Scaled HOB	YIELDS															
	2.5	6.0	9.0	10.0	11.5	28.0	33.0	40.0	47.0	60.0	65.0	100.0	300.0	350.0	1.1 M	1.4 M
0'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
300'	400	545	620	650	775	900	960	1050	1100	1200	1250	1400	2000	2100	3000	3300
640'	875	1220	1400	1450	1650	2000	2050	2200	2400	2500	2600	3000	4400	4500	6500	7000
900'	1250	1600	1900	2000	2400	2800	2950	3100	3300	3500	3600	4200	6000	6400	9000	10,000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	B.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF TGT.	
	TAC CHART	TARGET		SEG. SQUARE	SEG. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
0140A	0102	08623	SEGEZHA	6434	001	11	02	UR	N1	4380	670
0141A	0091	08632	TIKSHOZERO	6431	002	11	02	UR	*2	4000	270
0142A	0091		PONTSALENYOKI	6530		11	02	UR		4400	
0143A	0091	08626	OZERO TARVAYARVI	6530		11	02	UR	P1	3280	240
0144A	0168	08645	PALANGA	6521	027	11	02	UR	P	6560	400
0145A	0153		LUGA GONDOLITS	6429		11	02	UR	N1	3750	215
0146A	0091	08609	KONDOLUA	6731	002	11	02	UR			
0147A	0091	08624	OZERO IDEL	6433	001	11	02	UR	N1	3900	450
0148A	0168	08686	KARMELAVA	6424	016	11	02	UR	P1	6300	180
0149A	0153	08046	LEBYAZHNE MAL GORKA	5929		11	02	UR	P	3300	110
0150A	0153	08105	MOMJUSTE	5822	015	11	02	UR	P	6000	260
0151A	0153		TALLINN/NEHAYU	5924		11	02	UR			
0152A	0051	08634	OLENYA	6433	021	11	02	UR	P1		260
0153A	0051	08615	KULP YAYR	6932	002	11	02	UR	P1	9600	260
0154A	0091	08602	ALAKURTTI	6630	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	200
0155A	0051	08616	PECHENGA	6930	008	11	02	UR	P2	6900	200
0156A	0051	08628	MURMANSK NORTHEAST	6933	011	11	02	UR	P1	6375	260
0157A	0103	08613	HEMPETI	6028	008	11	02	UR	P2	6600	160
0158A	0092	08009	YOKANGA	6739	002	11	02	UR	P	6600	200
0159A	0102	08020	PETROZAVODSK NW	6134	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	260
0161A	0153	08092	KUUSIKU	5824	003	11	02	UR	P1	6600	200
0162A	0153	08107	SIVERSKIY	5930	013	11	02	UR	P	7200	200
0163A	0103	08606	LENINGRAD LEVASHOVO	6030	003	11	02	UR	P2	6000	200
0164A	0153	08051	LENINGRAD GORELOVO	5930	008	11	02	UR	P1	8200	200
0165A	0103	08614	SAKKOLA	6030	012	11	02	UR	P1	8600	200
0166A	0103	08610	SEVYASTYE	6029		11	02	UR	P1	8500	250
0167A	0103	08621	VYBOG'E	6029	005	11	02	UR	P1	6600	200
0168A	0103	08605	LENINGRAD KASIMOV	6030	001	11	02	UR	P1	7200	200
0169A	0153	08029	DEL GAVA	5623	004	11	02	UR	P1	6600	200
0172A	0153	08004	RIGA SKIROTOVA	5624	004	11	02	UR	P1	6500	200
0173A	0103	08602	LENINGRAD GORSKAYA	6030	010	11	02	UR	P2	3600	300
0174A	0103	08609	LENINGRAD UGLOVO	6030	005	11	02	UR	P1	4000	200
0225A	0103	08528	HELSINKI AIRPORT	6024	019	11	02	FI	P2	6560	195
0226A	0103	08216	LUONETJARVI JYVASKYL	6225	008	11	02	FI	P1	6560	200
0227A	0103	08629	TURVU RISSKO	6022	015	11	02	FI	P2	5900	200
0228A	0103	08223	PORI	6121	004	11	02	FI	P2	5900	200
0229A	0091	08210	OULU AIRPORT	6425	004	11	02	FI	P2	6560	200
0230A	0103	08201	HELSINKI NALMI	6025	006	11	02	FI	P1	4592	106
0231A	0103	08210	KUOPIO RISSALA	6327	005	11	02	FI	P2	8200	200
0232A	0103	08230	TAMPERE	6123	012	11	02	FI	T4	7100	2600

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN ENTITIES
The Information Contained in This Document Shall Not Be Distributed to Foreign Nationals or Their Representatives

Page 19

TOP SECRET

REF ID	TAC. TARGET		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	OEL OF 107.	
	CLAS. TARGET	TARGET		DEG. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
0233A	0091	08203	KEMI	6524	014	11	02	FI	F2	6500	196
0234A	0091	08202	KUJANI	6427	004	11	02	FI	F2	5477	197
0235A	0091	08206	ROYANIEMI	6625	007	11	02	FI	F2	6390	198
0236A	0103	08232	UTI	6046	016	11	02	FI	F2	5480	200
0237A	0103	08205	JOENSUU/ONTTALA	6224	004	11	02	FI	F2	6740	198
0238A	0103	08233	VAAKAKRUVSON	6321	003	11	02	FI	F2	5400	200
0239A	0051	08203	IVALO	6827	002	11	02	FI	F2	4295	196
0240A	0103	08214	LAPPEENRANTA	6128	006	11	02	FI	F2	5250	195
0241A	0103	08207	KAUHA	6323	006	11	02	FI	F1	5000	120
0242A	0103	08229	SIIKAKANGAS	6124	006	11	02	FI	P	7100	200
0251A	0169	00335	HALTIYSK	5419	008	16	PO	UR		5000	5000
0252A	0169	00408	SWINOUSSIL	5314	014	16	PO	PO		20000	4000
0253A	0169	00059	LIEPAJA	5620	001	16	PO	UR			
0254A	0169	00473	BARSEMUNCE	5412	019	16	PO	GE			
0255A	0169	00334	KALININGRAD	5420	004	11	02	UR		1700	300
0256A	0169	00078	LENINGRAD	5930	001	13	UR	UR			
0257A	0169	00182	KLAIPEDA	5521	001	16	PO	UR			
0258A	0112	00180	VENTSPILS	5721	001	16	PO	UR		23000	9000
0259A	0119	00082	GDYNIA	5418	004	16	PO	PO			
0260A	0113	00412	KRONSTADT	5929	004	16	PO	UR			
0261A	0119	00471	ROSTOCK	5412	014	16	PO	GE			
0262A	0170	00500	WISMAR	5311	005	16	PO	GE		8250	4600
0263A	0169	00470	STRALSUND	5413	003	16	PO	GE		7760	4120
0264A	0169	00472	SASSNITZ	5413	010	16	PO	GE		5000	1400
0265A	0169	00316	GOENSE	5418	019	16	PO	PO			
0266A	0169	00318	KOLBENZ	5415	003	16	PO	PO			
0267A	0113	00023	RIGA	5413	004	16	PO	UR			
0268A	0113	00408	LORONOSOV	5929	004	16	PO	UR			
0269A	0169	01674	MEL	5418	004	16	PO	PO		5000	1400
0270A	0092	00061	SEVYDOINSK	6439	005	22	PO	UR			
0271A	0051	00122	MURMANSK	6933	005	16	PO	UR			
0272A	0051	00017	ROSTA	6933	025	16	PO	UR		8000	2000
0273A	0051	00007	POLYARNYY	6933	008	16	PO	UR			
0274A	0051	00092	PECHENGA LIIAXHANG	6931	008	16	PO	UR		3500	1000
0275A	0051	00156	SAYDA GUBA	6933	008	22	PO	UR		4500	3600
0276A	0051	00153	OLENYA GUBA SUB BASE	6933	028	22	PO	PO			
0277A	0051	00054	VOKANGA	6839	001	16	PO	UR		6000	1500
0278A	0112	00029	NADVOYTSY LOCK	6334	001	16	PO	UR			
0279A	0112	00040	PARANOVA	6334	001	16	PO	UR		1000	50
0280A	0170	00007	LUDWIGSLUST	5311	005	13	OS	GE			

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	B.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VH		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF TGT.	
	WAC CHART	TARGET		REG. SQUAD	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
0242CEH	0170		SCHWERIN	5311				GE			
0263CR	0170		BAD KLEINEN	5311		13	05	GE			
0294C	0170	01096	WISMAR	5311		13	05	GE		3146	687
0285CEH	0170		PARCHIM	5311		13	05	GE			
0284CR	0169		KAROW	5312				GE			
0288CHH	0169		HOSTOCK	5412				GE			
0289CNR	0169		GREIFSWALD	5413				GE			
0290CLR	0169		NEUBRANDENBURG	5313		13	05	GE			
0291EGR	0169		NEUSTRELITZ	5313		21	P0	GE			
0292EGR	0169		PASEWALK	5314		21	P2	GE			
0294BD	0051	00215	MURMASHI	6832		19	G9	UR			
0296BD	0091	00041	KEMI	6824	003	23	06	FI	E	1200	30
0297BD	0091	00042	ROVANIEMI	6829	002	19	09	FI	G	970	30
0298R	0091		SODANKYLÄ	6727		12	P2	FI			
0299R	0051		IVALO	6827		12	P2	FI			
0300D	0091	00105	KAUKOMEN	6734		49	P6	FI	A	150	21
0301N	0092	00006	ARCHANGELSK	6440		18	P0	UR		13200	
0302N	0051	00161	TERIBERKA	6935		22	P0	UR			
0303N	0091	00004	BELOMORSK	6434		18	P0	UR			
0304BD	0169	00508	SZCZECIN	5316		19	U9	PO	R	765	45
0681E	0170	01106	SCHWERIN	5311		12	P2	GE			
0682E	0170	01105	SCHWERIN	5311		12	P2	GE			
0683E	0170	01681	HAGENOW	5311		2	P2	GE			
0684E	0170	01094	WISMAR	5311		10	P0	GE		2000	1500
0685EG	0169	00200	GUSTROT	5312		21	P0	GE		770	8400
0688D	0170		PANPRIN	5310		21	06	GE	F	500	
0689D	0170		WICKENDORF	5311		21	06	GE	F	2050	
069CR	0170		KRITZOWBURG	5311		12	P2	GE			
0711C	0170		GREVESMÜHLEN	5311		13	05	GE		1500	125
0712C	0170		GADEBUSCH	5311		13	05	GE		1700	100
0713C	0170	00960	HAGENOW	5311	010	13	05	GE		4300	400
0715D	0170	01575	SELMSDOORF	5310				GE			
0716D	0170		LUDERSDOORF	5310				GE			
0718D	0170		ZARSENTIN	5310				GE			
0726N	0170	00391	MOLTENAU LEVENSM	5410	008	51	P0	GW		1300	1300
0727BD	0170	00206	RENDSBURG	5409	017	19	09	GW	G	550	27
0728BD	0170	00204	GRUNENTHAL	5409	010	22	09	GW	J	400	40
0729N	0170	00390	BRUNSBÜTTELKOPF	5319	043	51	P0	GW		2450	1500
0730D	0170	01620	KAPPELN	5409		22	08	GW	J	900	
0731BD	0170	00212	LAUENBURG	5310	029	22	09	GW	L	1700	80

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

The Information Contained in This Document Was Not to Be Disclosed to Foreign Nationals or Their Representatives

Page 21

TOP SECRET

REF ID	TAC TARGET		TARGET NAME	TAC TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	ACR 57-161	
	TAC	TARGET		REF. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
07102	0170		SCHLESWIG	5409		12	P2	GE			
07108	0170	01741	KIEL	5410		12	P2	GE		525	225
07109	0170		NEUMUNSTER	5409		12	P2	GE			
07109	0170		ITZHOE	5309		12	P2	GE			
07408			FLENSBURG	5409		12	P2	GE			
07411			LUBECK	5310		12	P2	GE			
10008	0231		HEILIGENSTADT	5110	080	12	P2	GE			40
10010	0231		ARENHAUSEN	5109		49	P0	GE	A	100	
10020	0231		DIETZENRODE	5110		44	P0	GE	B	50	
10038	0231		WONDIS	5110		12	P2	GE			
10048	0231	06796	DINGLSTADT	5110		12	P2	GE			
10058	0170		WEFERLINGEN RD CTR	5211		12	P4	GE			
10060	0170	01337	HELMSTEDT	5211		38	P0	GE	C	536	50
10078	0170		HANERSLEBEN RD CTR	5211		12	P2	GE			
10089	0170		HEBSEN	5210		12	P2	GE			
10090	0231		OSTERWIECK	5110		12	P2	GE			
10107	0170		LEITZLINGER HEIDE	5211		12	P2	GE			
10117	0170		SCHERNEBECK	5211		12	P2	GE			
10125	0170		NEUENHOFE	5211		12	P2	GE			
10138	0170		KLOTZE	5211		12	P2	GE			
10147	0170		FLECHTINGEN	5211		12	P4	GE			
10158	0231		HUELAND	5110		12	P2	GE			
10165	0231		HASSELPOLLE	5113		12	P2	GE			
10178	0231		NETZKATER	5113		12	P2	GE			
10188	0231		HOLBACH	5113		12	P2	GE			
10198	0231		PUSTLEBEN	5113		12	P2	GE			
10202	0170		DIESDORF	5210		12	P2	GE			
10208	0170		WONDBURG	5111		12	P2	GE			
10218	0170		LUDWIGSLUST	5311		12	P2	GE			
10338	0170		GRITZIER	5311		12	P2	GE			
10367	0170		LUTHEN	5311		12	P2	GE			
10408	0170		LUDWIGSLUST	5311		12	P2	GE			
10608	0169		NEUSTRELITZ II	5213		12	P2	GE			
10708	0170	00148	WITTENBERGE	5211	008	19	09	GE	G	2540	35
10708	0169	00638	SCHONHAUSEN	5218	006	19	09	GE	R	2660	30
10730	0170	00595	TANGERMUNDE	5211	008	19	09	GE	G	2740	30
10760	0170	00085	HONENWARTHE	5211	030	19	09	GE	G	1280	80
10788	0170	00738	SCHONEBECK	5211	034	19	09	GE	G	2200	85
10808	0231	00376	BARBY	5111	005	19	09	GE	R	2475	25
10918	0231	04212	CALBE (GRIZENHE)	5111	050	22	08	GE	J	1300	35

TAC. TARGET NO.	VH	COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	ELEV. OF TGT.	
				LENGTH IN FEET	BATH IN FEET
TAC. TARGET NO.	VH	COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	LENGTH IN FEET	BATH IN FEET
0169-01016	026	13 05 GE		5800	700
0169-01069	050	13 05 GE		12000	1500
0169-01781	029	13 05 GE		3000	350
0169-01420	032	13 05 GE		4500	400
0169-01162	008	13 05 GE		3950	1000
0169		13 05 GE		3250	300
0169		13 05 GE		2500	500
0169-01780	095	13 05 GE		6400	
0169-00511	034	13 05 GE		12500	800
0231		13 05 GE		1200	200
0169-00242	025	19 09 PO R		600	34
0169-00248	057	19 09 PO R		660	33
0169-00375	011	22 09 PO J		840	80
0169-00252	072	19 09 GE G		820	26
0169-00250	071	20 09 GE P		750	35
0169-00293		19 09 PO G		700	33
0169-00291	091	19 09 PO R		2500	35
0169-00238	003	PO			
0169		GE			
0169-00246	068	21 06 GE F		800	30
0170-00212	029	22 09 GW L		1700	50
0169-00634	005	13 05 PO		8000	1700
0169-02238		13 05 PO			
0231		GE CK			
0231		19 09 GE S		350	40
0231-02540	109	GE E		360	60
0231-02538	053	49 PO GE A		660	30
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0170		12 P2 GE			
0231		12 P2 GE			

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. MAY BE EXPOSED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
 The information contained in this document is to be controlled to Foreign Nationals or Their Representatives.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	R.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	REL. OF TOT.	
	WAC CHART	TARGET		DEG. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
1316R	0231		FLEND	5110		12	P2	GE			
1316R	0231		ELLRICH	5110		12	P2	GE			
1317R	0231		ZWINGE	5110		12	P2	GE			
1318R	0231		HACKENRODE	5110		12	P2	GE			
1319R	0231		ECKLINGERCOL	5110		12	P2	GE			
1320R	0231		LEITOE <LEINEFELDE>	5110		12	P2	GE			
1321R	0231		UDER	5110		12	P2	GE			
1322R	0231		EIGENRIEDEN	5110		12	P2	GE			
1323R	0231		SONDERSHAUSEN	5110		12	P2	GE			
1326R	0231		BLANKENBURG RD CTR	5110		12	P2	GE			
1329R	0170	01583	BRAUNSCHWEIG<WENDEN>	5210	003	22	08	GW	J	290	80
1370R	0170		HAMELERWALD	5210		12	P2	GE			
1331D	0231	00832	LIEPOLDHAUSEN	5109	084	22	08	GE	J	1400	72
1400R	0231		NORDHAUSEN	5110		12	P2	GE			
1402R	0231		HALBERSTADT	5111		12	P2	GE			
1404R	0231		BLANKENBURG	5110		12	P2	GE			
1405R	0231		SANGERHAUSEN NR CTR	5111		12	P2	GE			
1406R	0231		SONDERHAUSEN	5110		12	P2	GE			
2400R	0231	06809	EISENACH SW	5010		12	P2	GE			
2401D	0231		EISENACH NE	5010		12	P2	GE			
2402D	0231		EICHRODT	5010		12	P2	GE			
2405R	0231		CESKA KUBICE HWY INT	4912		12	P2	CZ			
2406F	0231		WEININGEN	5010		12	P2	GE			
2506F	0231		GERSTUNGEN	5010		12	P2	GE			
2507F	0231		GIESA	5009		12	P2	GE			
2508F	0231		KALTENSUNDHEIM	5010		12	P2	GE			
2509F	0231		HIRSCHBERG	5011		12	P2	GE			
2511R	0231		WEINIG HWY INT	5010		12	P2	GE			
2512Y	0231		EISENACH CC & TRPS	5010		12	P2	GE			
2513D	0231		GOTHA	5010				GE			
2515CR	0231		SOML	5010				GE			
2519HR	0231		ZELEZNA RUDA	4913				CZ			
3420R	0232	01012	ZILINA	4918	008	19	09	CZ	R	370	15
3422C	0232	00859	BRECLAV	4816	001	13	05	CZ		9500	900
3423R	0232	00448	HLOHOVEC	4817	007	19	09	CZ	R	930	15
3424D	0232	01662	SINTAVA	4817	007	19	09	CZ	O	930	25
3425R	0232	00455	SALA	4817	006	22	09	CZ	K	1450	20
3427BD	0232	00421	BRATISLAVA	4817	005			CZ	O	1350	55

TARGET NO.	S.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF TGT.	
	WAC CHART	TARGET		REG. SQUARE	SEC. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
34808	0231	01303	DECIN	5014	017	19	09	CZ	R	810	20
34810	0231	01549	DECIN	5014	021	19	09	CZ	R	800	48
34828	0231	01304	DECIN SKOPDMOKLY	5014	022	19	09	CZ	R	840	16
34830	0231	02055	CESKA LIPA	5014	024	13	05	CZ		5200	900
34840	0231	02046	LIBEREC	5015	006	13	05	CZ		8000	1000
34858	0231	00728	UST' NAD LABEM STRKY	5014	018	19	09	CZ	R	820	14
34868	0231	00812	LITOMERICE	5014	019	19	09	CZ	R	1100	20
34870	0231	01544	BRANOVY NAD LABEM	5014	023	21	06	GE	R	600	30
34888	0231	00729	CELAKOVICE	5014	034	19	09	CZ	R	545	35
34900	0231	01267	NYMBURK	5015	001	13	05	CZ		8500	1600
34910	0231	01002	PODEBRADY	5015	001	19	09	CZ	S	328	30
34920	0231	00249	KOLIN	5015	002	13	05	CZ		11000	750
34930	0231	00819	KOLIN	5015	002	29	08	CZ	G	600	42
34948	0231	01538	PARDUBICE	5015	001	19	09	CZ	R	510	30
34950	0231	01537	PARDUBICE	5015	010	20	09	CZ	P	320	25
34968	0231	00713	JAROMER	5015	004	22	09	CZ	L	460	18
35080	0232	00686	STEINAU	5116				PO	QR		
35018	0231	02292	MIRSCHBERG	5015	009	29	08	PO	G	568	30
35028	0232	00689	BRESLAU WROCLAW	5117	010	19	09	PO	R	1493	22
35030	0232	00748	BROKAU WROCLAW	5117	034	13	05	PO		11525	1000
35100	0232	00729	OSTRAVA	4918	014	19	09	CZ	S	295	40
35110	0232	00550	PREROV	4917	001	13	05	CZ		10600	1100
35128X	0232	00443	OLOMOUK	4917				CZ			
35138	0232	01327	HRANICE W	4917	014	41	PO	CZ	A	1300	30
35148	0232	01595	MORAVICANY	4916	023	22	09	CZ	K	350	20
35148C	0232	02163	HEYDEBREK KEDZIERZYN	5018				PO			
35168	0232	00720	RATIBOR RACIBORZ	5018	002	19	09	PO	R	310	30
35170	0232	02019	CESKY TESIN	4918	010	13	05	CZ		7500	750
35208CD			GOSCHWITZ	5011				GE			
35238C	0231		BAD MÜLZA GROSSHORN	5111				GE			
35248DC			NEUMERG	5111				GE			
35250	0231	01707	WEISSENFELS E	5111	018	49	PO	GE	A	340	47
35278	0231	01734	WURZEN	5112	012	19	09	GE	R	1190	23
35280	0231	06807	SPADTODA	5011	051	22	05	GE	J	880	78
35290	0231	03107	ZEITZ	5112	031	13	05	GE		9300	700
35300	0231	04801	LANGENBERG THIESCHIT	5012	038	22	04	GE	J	394	50
35310	0231	00805	GERA	5012	008	13	05	GE		7230	1300
35320	0231	01969	ALTENBURG	5112		10	PO	GE			
35330	0231	01283	ALTENBURG	5012	018	13	05	GE		10330	1000
35340	0231	04494	CRIMMITSCHAU	5012	034	22	08	GE	J	1600	75

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	S.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VI		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF. 1ST.	
	TAC CHART	TARGET		DES. SQUARE	2ND NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
36038	0169	00571	ZULLICHAU SULECHOW	5215	015	22	09	PO	L	1500	15
36068	0169	01234	ZULLICHAU SULECHOW	5215		19	09	PO	B	330	15
36070	0169	00572	ZULLICHAU SULECHOW	5215		20	09	PO	B	1300	35
36080	0169	00576	CROSSN KROSNO ODRZNS	5215	031	19	09	PO	C	936	42
36090	0169	01488	CROSSN KROSNO ODRZNS	5215		49	PO	PO	A	766	46
36100	0231	01793	GRUENBG ZIELONA GORA	5115	040	13	05	PO		3400	1000
36110	0232	01172	GLOGAU GLOGOW	5116	044	13	05	PO		11000	1000
36120	0231	06403	SWIETOSZOW URBAN STR	5115		22	08	PO	J	300	
36150	0231	00248	KLATOVY	4913	009	13	05	CZ		3100	300
36165	0231	04111	SUSICE	4913	012	19	09	CZ	R	200	15
36178	0231	0.107	KLATOVICE	4913	023	19	09	CZ	S	250	15
36180C	0231		STRAKONICE	4913				CZ			
36190	0231	05069	PODOLSKO	4914	001	22	08	CZ	E	1650	25
36200	0231	02857	TABOR	4914		13	05	CZ		5000	450
36210	0231	03849	PLANA NAD LUZNICI	4914	015	38	PO	CZ	C	480	15
36220C	0231		PROTIVIN	4914				CZ			
36245	0231	00718	CEKKE BUDEJOVICE	4814	004	19	09	CZ	R	480	18
36250	0231	04401	CEKKE BUDEJOVICE	4814	017	21	06	CZ	F	320	40
36260C	0231	00220	CEKKE BUDEJOVICE	4814				CZ			
36270C	0231		PISEK	4914				CZ			
36280	0232	01061	WIEN STRASSHOF	4816	015	13	05	AU		5250	500
36310C	0212	00351	TULLN	4816	015	19	09	AU	O	1450	75
36325	0231	06192	LIMBERGESCHLEINZBACH	4815	048	22	09	AU	K	280	45
36335	0231	04073	NEULENGBACH	4815	009	41	PO	AU	A	430	26
36345	0231	04071	HADERSDORF	4815	004	19	09	AU	A	330	18
36350	0231	04411	SANCT POLTEN	4815	013	23	06	AU	E	670	67
36365	0231	00655	KREMS	4815	001	19	09	AU	R	2140	18
36375	0231	03530	ERLAUF (BRUNN)	4815	010	19	09	AU	R	278	17
36380	0231	04815	WINDEN	4815	012	20	09	AU	S	390	22
36395	0232	00451	DEVINSKACHMARCHEGG	4816		29	06	CZ			
364350	0231	00656	LINZ	4814	001	19	09	AU	O	1270	38
36470	0231	01745	LINZ	4814	009	22	08	AU	J	1000	100
36485C	0231		LINZ	4814				AU			
36490	0231	02652	GRUND	4814	011	13	05	AU		3200	700
36505	0231	03532	ENNS	4814	007	19	09	AU	R	530	25
365180	0231	00654	HAUTHAUSEN	4814	031	19	09	AU	R	5100	30
36530	0231	02355	ENNS	4814	003	19	09	AU	O	870	29
36545	0231	01383	AMSTETTEN SOUTH	4814	010	22	09	AU	L	250	40
36550	0252	01296	KLAUS SOUTH	4714	041	19	09	AU	R	340	15
36565	0252	01298	GROSS REISSLING	4714	003	19	09	AU	R	191	10

TARGET ID	S.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC TARGET NO.		VH		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DEL OF-TGT.	
	TAG CHART	TARGET		SEC. SQUAD	SEC. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
4004C	0252	00080	PECS	4618	004	13	05	HU		4800	370
400500	0252	00150	BAJA	4618	001	19	09	HU	D	1870	39
400600	0252	00567	DUNAFOLDVAR	4618	002	19	09	HU	R	1720	52
400700	0252	00945	DUNAFOLDVAR	4618		19	09	HU	S	270	35
400800	0252	00573	GYORSZABADI	4717	001	19	09	HU	O	1170	40
400900	0252	00307	KOMAROM	4718	001	19	09	HU	R	1418	40
401000	0252	00585	KOMAROM	4718	007	19	09	HU	O	1350	20
4011C	0252	00587	CSORNA	4717	009	13	05	HU		4400	550
4012B	0252	00503	GYOR	4717	001	19	09	HU	R	550	25
4013C	0252	00685	MEGYESHALOM	4717		13	05	HU		9250	840
4014C	0252	00879	SCARDON	4716	004	13	05	HU		8700	600
4015C	0252	00878	SZOMBATHELY	4716	002	13	05	HU		6800	700
4017E	0252	00879	KFCSKEMET	4619		10	P0	HU		4550	3610
4018E	0252	00987	KOMAROM	4718		10	P0	HU		1650	1400
4019E	0252	00997	PECS	4618		10	P0	HU		1000	650
4020E	0252	00999	SZEKESFEHERVAR	4718		10	P0	HU		4550	3900
4021E	0252	01862	SZEKESZARD BKS & HQ	4618		10	P0	HU			
4022E	0252	01000	SZOMBATHELY	4716		12	P2	HU			
4023E	0252	01810	TANASI ARMY BKS NO1	4618		10	P0	HU			
4024E	0252	00983	VT STRENN	4718		12	P0	HU			
402400	0252	00284	BEOGRAD	4420	002	20	09	YU	P	2710	42
402500	0252	00307	NOVI SAD	4519		19	09	YU	R	1160	25
4026E	0252	02015	BUELOVAR ARMY BAS	4516		12	P2	YU			
402700	0252	01267	BOTOVO	4616	003	22	08	YU	J	1180	22
4028C	0252	00072	BROD	4518		13	05	YU		3700	740
402900	0252	00075	OSJEK	4518	010	19	09	YU	O	665	16
4030C	0252	00070	VINKOVCI	4518	004	13	05	YU		17300	830
4031E	0252	01077	CAKOVEC	4616		12	P2	YU			
4042B	0252	00051	DRAVOGRAD	4615	021	19	09	YU	R	549	17
4043C	0252	01329	KOPRIVNICIA	4616	001	13	05	YU		3700	400
4044B	0252	00031	MARIBOR	4615	022	19	09	YU	S	549	45
4044E	0252	01073	MARIBOR CAV BKS	4615	008	12	P2	YU		1200	800
4046B	0252	00033	PETTAU PTUJ	4615		22	09	YU	L	722	25
4047D	0252	00058	PETTAU PTUJ	4615		20	06	YU	D	700	50
4049F	0252	01081	VARAZDIN ARMY BKS	4616	004	12	P2	YU			
4049E	0252	02013	BANJA LUKA	4417		12	P2	YU		2100	1600
4050C	0252		BANOVA JARUGA	4516		13	05	YU			
4051C	0252	00047	CELJE	4616	017	13	05	YU		2390	400
4052E	0252	02072	GOSPIC	4415		12	P2	YU			
4053E	0252	02002	JASTREBARSKO	4515		12	P2	YU			

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	B.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		YM		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF TGT.	
	TAC CHART	TARGET		DES. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	BWTH IN FEET
4044C	0252	00463	KARLOVAC	4515		13	05	YU		4250	250
4045E	0252	02003	KNIN ARMY BKS SW	4416		12	02	YU			
4046E	0252	02009	NOVO MESTO	4515		12	02	YU		3600	2200
4047D	0252	00022	PODSUSED (ORES.E.)	4515	0.3	20	09	YU	P	720	23
4048C	0252	00140	SISAK	4516		13	05	YU			
4049C	0252		TREBNJE	4515		13	05	YU			
4040C	0252	00044	ZAGREB	4515	004	13	05	YU		3600	900
4041B	0252	00034	ZAGREB	4515	009	19	09	YU	S	500	35
4042D	0252	00048	ZAGREB	4515		23	06	YU	E	720	30
4043C	0252	0.553	ZINCANI MOST STEINER	4615	003	13	05	YU		1700	150
4064F	0252		BISCHOFLAK	4614		12	02	YU			
4065F	0252		DELNICE	4514		12	02	YU			
4066F	0252	01061	KRANJ ARMY BKS NW1	4614	001	12	02	YU			
4067F	0252		LJUBLJANA	4614		12	02	YU			
4068F	0252		LOGATEC	4514		12	02	YU			
4069F	0252		MATTUGLIE	4514		12	02	YU			
4070F	0252	02000	POSTUMIA POSTOJNA NE	4514		12	02	YU			
4071F	0252	01996	RIJEKA ARMY BARRACKS	4514		12	02	YU			
4072F	0252		VILLA DEL NEVOZO	4514		12	02	YU			
4073F	0252	02080	VRHNICA BKS NORTH	4514		12	02	YU			
4074C	0252	01327	BRUNNENFELING	4616	006	13	05	AU		2400	125
4075C	0252	01684	FRIEDBERG	4716		30	03	AU			
4076C	0252		GERSDORF JUNCTION	4615		44	03	AU			
4077C	0252	00355	KLAGENFURT	4614	006	13	05	AU		5000	
4078B	0252	00495	KNITTELFELD	4714	007	19	09	AU	R	345	18
4079D	0252	00744	LAVANNO	4614	018	22	08	AU	J	545	10
4081C	0252		ST VIEH	4614		13	05	AU		1900	
4082C	0252		STEINHAUS	4715		13	05	AU			
4083C	0252	00488	WIENER NEUSTADT	4714	001	13	05	AU		6720	750
4084C	0252		WOLFSBERG	4614		13	05	AU			
4085C	0252	00700	BISCHOFSHOFEN	4713		13	05	AU		4500	500
4086C	0252		WIEFLAU	4714		13	05	AU		2000	
4087C	0252	00581	INNSBRUCK	4711		13	05	AU		3875	1080
4088B	0252	00678	LEOBEN	4716	012	19	09	AU	R	268	3
4089C	0252		PECHNOF STEINACH	4711		13	05	AU		2000	
4090C	0252	01744	SELZTHAL	4714	003	13	05	AU		4200	600
4091C	0252	00730	WORGLE	4712	008	13	05	AU		3780	850
4140E	0322	00275	TOLBUKHIN	4327		12	02	BU			
4141B	0322	00289	POLYANOVSKO KARMODAT	4226	001	19	09	BU	R	1500	40
4142C	0322	00411	POLYANOVSKO KARMODAT	4226		13	05	BU		8300	100

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	O.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC TARGET NO.		VN	COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DEL. OF. 167.	
	TAC CHART	TARGET		DES. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.				LENGTH IN FEET	BWTH IN FEET
4193E	0322	00085	PLOVOIV	4224		10	00	BU		
4194C	0322	00414	DIMITROVGRAD RAKOVSK	4225	003	13	05	BU	3500	330
4195AC	0322	00083	MARIYSA	4226	001			BU		
4200B	0251	00796	RAMNICUL VALCEA	4227		19	09	BU	672	20
4201C	0251		CARACAL	4424		13	05	BU	4500	
4202C	0251	00084	COASUL SYALIN	4525		13	05	HU	4300	1750
4203C	0251	00167	POESTI/CLINICAL	4426		13	05	HU	13000	1500
4204B	0251	00200	COLIBASI	4427	002	19	09	BU	636	20
4205B0	0322	00521	GIURGIU	4326	004	20	09	BU	10580	40
4206B	0250	00312	SANNICUL SARA	4527		19	09	BU	400	30
4207B	0251	00261	MIZRU	4528		49	00	MU	653	35
4208C	0250	00116	REDUTIA	4429	005	13	05	BU	3500	300
4209C	0250	00126	Galati	4529		13	05	BU		450
4210C	0250	00319	BRAILA	4527		13	05	BU	4400	300
4211C	0251	00157	CRATOVA	4423		13	05	BU	8000	300
4212B0	0251	00700	BRANISTEA	4423		22	08	BU		
4213C	0322	00435	VIDIN	4322		13	05	BU	2620	400
4214C	0250	00107	IASI	4727		13	05	BU		
4215C	0251	00625	BUZAU	4526		13	05	BU	10300	
4216B	0251	00170	PITESTI	4428		19	09	BU	820	20
4217C	0251	00114	BUCURESTI	4428		13	05	BU	15500	1450
4218B	0250	00117	CERNAVODA	4428	001	19	09	BU	5800	30
4219B	0250	00119	PETESTI	4427		23	06	BU	3500	30
4220C	0322	00286	MIO	4327		13	05	VC	4200	500
4221B	0322	00180	VRANJE	4221		19	09	VC	210	15
4222B	0322		VRANJE	4221	004	19	09	VC	18	14
4223B	0322		KUHANDVO	4221		12	02	VC		
4224B	0322	00171	SKOPJE	4127	003	19	09	VC	300	19
4225B0	0322	00636	GENIR KAPILA	4122		19	09	VC	360	18
4226B	0322	01014	STIM	4122		12	02	VC		
4227D	0322	00470	DETROLE	4127	002	23	06	AL	420	22
4228D	0322	00705	ELVASAN	4127		19	09	AL	592	18
4229C	0322	00871	MORLE	4020		12	02	AL		
4230C	0322	00840	VLONG	4014		20	04	AL	400	23
4231C	0322	00110	KUYAISI	4242		13	05	UB	3700	
4232D	0322	00013	SANTREDA	4242		18	00	UB	660	
4233C	0322	00132	SANTREDA	4242	029	13	05	UB	3900	370
4234B	0322	00034	SANTREDA	4242		19	09	UB	880	11
4235D	0322	00379	VEVLAKH	4247		20	04	UB	110	20
4236B	0322	00111	VEVLAKH	4017	004	10	04	UB	810	20

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967 O-345-000
 The information contained in this document is classified as TOP SECRET in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

TOP SECRET

Page 31

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	D.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. O' TGT.	
	SAC CHART	TARGET		DEG. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	WIDTH IN FEET
4237	0340	00100	DZMULFA	3845		12	P2	UR			
4238	0340	00001	NAKICHEVAN	3945		13	05	UR		4000	140
4239	0324	00179	AKHALTSIKHE	4142		12	P2	UR			
4240	0325	00449	SHAGAL	4044		19	09	UR	R	195	15
4241	0325	00087	LENINAKAN	4043	011	13	05	UR		3700	300
4242	0340	00090	DZMULFA	3845		18	09	UR	T	450	30
4243	0340		KH01	3844	001	49	P0	UR	A	200	15
4244	0339	00037	MIANDOW	3646	001	22	08	UR	J	460	30
4245	0340	00066	DZMULFA	3845				UR			
4246	0339	00050	MIANEH	3747	004	49	P0	UR	B	685	20
4247	0340	00047	RAWANDUZ	3644		20	09	UR	P	140	12
4248	0340	00033	IRBIL	3643		20	09	UR	P	500	20
4249	0340	00070	AL KAWSIL	3643	006	20	09	UR	P	1029	26
4250	0427	00034	AL TUN KUPRI	3544	006	19	09	UR	R	780	16
4251	0427	00034	AL TUN KUPRI WEST	3544	074	20	09	UR	P	380	22
4252	0427		FAOURAH	3344	028			UR		497	12
4253	0427	00034	AL FALLUJAH	3343	003	19	09	UR	O	910	15
4254	0340	00020	MOSUL	3643		13	05	UR		4225	1025
4255	0427	00037	DAYR AZ ZAWR	3540	002	21	06	SY	P	1400	20
4256	0340	00082	AL HASAKAH	3640	001	20	09	SY	P	300	15
4257	0427	00032	AR RAQQAH	3539	001	22	08	SY	J	2045	30
4258	0341	00182	HALAB	3637	003	13	05	SY		2605	200
4259	0426		DAMAS KADEM	3336		12	P2	SY			
4260	0426	00199	HOMS	3436	009	12	P2	SY			
4261	0341		HURA DARA VIADUCT	3636	001	19	09	SY	R	1272	15
5000A	0252	08052	SZEKESFEHEVAR	4718	035	11	02	HU	P1	6000	200
5001A	0251	08084	TAPIOSZENTMARTON	4719	002	11	02	HU	N1	7000	1100
5002A	0251	08629	LUNA	4623		11	02	RU	P1	6500	
5003A	0251	08052	BATAJNICA	4420	005	11	02	YU	P1	8700	150
5004A	0251	08275	BEOGRAD SURCIN	4420		11	02	YU	P1	8700	700
5005A	0251	08070	BEOGRAD/ZEMIN	4420	031	11	02	YU	P1	8250	260
5006A	0252	08032	CERKLJE	4515	001	11	02	YU	P1	8200	160
5007A	0321	08062	MOSTAR KOSOR	4317	002	11	02	YU	P1	8200	160
5008A	0252	08001	PLESO	4516	001	11	02	YU	P1	8200	170
5009A	0252	08025	PULA	4413	001	11	02	YU	P1	8200	150
5010A	0251	08005	SOMBOR	4519	002	11	02	YU	P1	8300	220
5011A	0252	08095	TUZLA	4418	001	11	02	YU	P1	8200	160
5012A	0252	08037	ZEMUNIK	4415	001	11	02	YU	P1	8200	160
5013A	0252	08070	GRAZ	4615	002	11	02	AU	P1	4920	150
5014A	0252	08089	INNENRICK WEST	4711	002	11	02	AU	P1	6250	136
5015A	0252	08060	KLAGENFURT	4616	001	11	02	AU	P1	6740	148

TARGET ID	U.S. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC TARGET NO.		VW		COUNTRY CODE		DEL OF TEST	
	TAC CHART	TARGET		DEG. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.				TYPE	LENGTH IN FEET	BWTH IN FEET
5119A	0249	08229	OSIPENKO	4636	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5120A	0233	08057	PERVOMAYSK	4630	002	11	02	UR	P1	7800	1300
5121A	0250	08603	PESCHANGYE	4633	011	11	02	UR	P1	6100	150
5122A	0249	08251	ROSTOV NW	4734	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	300
5123A	0324	08634	SANTREDIA NORTH	4242	001	11	02	UR	P1	6000	450
5124A	0250	08714	SEVASTOPOL KHERSONES	4433	011	11	02	UR	P1	6100	175
5125A	0250	08007	SIMFEROPOL	4434	004	11	02	UR	P2	5600	200
5126A	0250	08717	SIMFEROPOL NORTH	4533	007	11	02	UR	P1	7800	400
5128A	0234	08076	DONETSK STALINO	4837		11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5129A	0249	08271	TARANOS NW	4737	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5130A	0325	08713	TILIST/SOGANLUG	4144	009	11	02	UR	P1	6000	270
5131A	0249	08071	TIKHORETSK	4540	003	11	02	UR	P1	7500	200
5132A	0325	06745	TSITELU TSKARO	4146		11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5133A	0233	08111	VAPNYARCA	4828		11	02	UR	P1	3200	400
5134A	0325	08749	VERKHNE KEDI	4146	006	11	02	UR	P1	7000	450
5135A	0250	08766	VORONKOVO	4729	003	11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5136A	0250	08737	VOZNESENSK	4731	001	11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5137A	0233	08086	YARNOLINTSY	4926		11	02	UR	P1	4000	240
5138A	0325	08721	YEREVAN	4044		11	02	UR	P1	7400	165
5139A	0249	08295	YEYSK	4638	004	11	02	UR	P1	6600	400
5140A	0249	08302	ZAPOROZHYE EAST	4735	016	11	02	UR	P1	7000	200
5141A	0322	08055	NTS	4321	002	11	02	UR	P1	4450	150
5142A	0322	08057	PETROVAC	4121	002	11	02	UR	P1	6200	150
5143A	0322	08085	TITOGRAD NEW	4219	003	11	02	UR	P1	6200	150
5144A	0444	08000	ABADAN	3048	001	11	02	IR	P2	4000	195
5145A	0428	08002	HAMADAN	3448	001	11	02	IR	P2	5400	150
5146A	0428	08003	ESFAHAN	3251	001	11	02	IR	P2	11400	150
5147A	0428	08005	KERMANSHAN	3447	001	11	02	IR	P2	6000	160
5148A	0339	08201	TAURIZ	3846	005	11	02	IR	P2	6200	150
5149A	0428	08001	TEHRAN DOSMAN TAPREN	3551	005	11	02	IR	P2	5445	150
5150A	0428	08011	TEHRAN MOHRALLO	3551	006	11	02	IR	P1	10000	217
5151A	0428	08010	TEHRAN DALEH MURGEN	3551	007	11	02	IR	P1	6000	150
5152A	0427	08013	QASHID	3344	013	11	02	IR	P3	9000	180
5153A	0427	08003	BAGHDAD WEST	3344	001	11	02	IR	P2	7000	150
5154A	0445	08002	BASRA	3047	001	11	02	IR	P2	6000	150
5155A	0427	08007	HABBIANIYA	3343	001	11	02	IR	P1	6300	150
5156A	0427	08023	HABBIANIYA PLATEAU	3343	004	11	02	IR	P3	4000	150
5157A	0427	08009	K I	3544	001	11	02	IR	P2	6000	150
5158A	0427	08022	KIRKUK MILITARY	3544	004	11	02	IR	P2	9000	165
5159A	0340	08214	NOMAL	3643	004	11	02	IR	P2	7100	600

Special Handling Required Not Suitable for Foreign Distribution
This information contained in this document shall not be disclosed to foreign elements of this Government

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	S.E. NUMBER		TARGET NAME	TAC. TARGET NO.		VN		COUNTRY CODE	TYPE	DES. OF TGT.	
	SAC CHART	TARGET		DECS. SQUARE	SEQ. NO.					LENGTH IN FEET	BIRTH IN FEET
11604	0445	08003	SHATRAN	3047	002	11	02	10	D	4300	150
11614	0341	08002	ALEPPO	2637	004	11	02	SY	D	7450	150
11624	0426	08000	DANASCUS	3336	007	11	02	SY	D	9370	150
11634	0427	08000	DEIR E ZOR	3540	006	11	02	SY	D	2500	170
11644	0426	08050	QUMAYR	3734	020	11	02	SY	D	8200	150
11654	0426	08005	HAMA	3536		11	02	SY	D	5400	400
11664	0341	08006	HAJIN EL ABLOD	3637	008	11	02	SY	D	6700	
11674	0426	08028	SAM. ES SAHRA	3336	011	11	02	SY	B	6000	150
11684	0447	03012	AMU SUWEIR	3032		11	02	EG	D	4750	150
11694	0447	08015	CAIRO ALMAZA	3031	002	11	02	EG	D	6680	160
11704	0447	08016	CAIRO INTERNATIONAL	3031	003	11	02	EG	D	10800	197
11714	0447	08018	CAIRO WEST	3030	001	11	02	EG	D	9600	150
11724	0447	08002	DEKHEILA	3129	020	11	02	EG	D	5000	140
11734	0447	08020	EL ARISH	3123	001	11	02	EG	D	8200	150
11744	0447	08024	EL MANSURA	2031	059	11	02	EG	D	9000	120
11754	0447	08022	FAYID	3032	005	11	02	EG	D	6900	150
11764	0447	08044	GEBEL LIBNI	3033	004	11	02	EG	D	8500	110
11774	0344	08009	MURGHADA NEW	2733	001	11	02	EG	D	8500	115
11784	0447	08025	INCHAS	3031	005	11	02	EG	D	8100	120
11794	0447	08027	KABRIT	3032	007	11	02	EG	D	8750	150
11804	0447	08061	KAFR DAUD	3030	013	11	02	EG	D	9000	150
11814	0544	08001	LUXOR	2532	001	11	02	EG	D	6850	150
11824	0322	00268	DUPRES	4119	001	16	00	AL		5900	2790
11834	0343		FORT PALERMO	4018		16	00	AL			
11844	0343	00181	SARANDI	3920	001	16	00	AL			
11854	0322	00236	SAZAN	4019		16	00	AL			
11864	0322	00258	SHENGJIN	4119		16	00	AL			
11874	0322	00387	VLONE	4019		16	00	AL			
11884	0252		CITTANOVA	4513		16	00	YU			
11894	032	00033	DUBROVNIK RAGUSA	4218		16	00	YU			
11904	0252	01926	KRALJEVICA	4514		16	00	YU			
11914	0252		LUSSINPICCOLO	4414		16	00	YU			
11924	0252		PIRANO	4513		16	00	YU			
11934	0252	00270	PULA POLA	4413		16	00	YU			
11944	0252	00387	RIJEKA FLUME	4514		16	00	YU			
11954	0252	00903	ROVINJ KROVIGNO	4513		16	00	YU			
11964	0252		SENIKSENY	4414		16	00	YU			
11974	0321	00144	SIMENIK (SEBENICO)	4315		16	00	YU			
11984	0321	00116	SPLIT (SPALATO)	4316		16	00	YU			
11994	0252	00629	ZADAR	4418		16	00	YU			

SPECIAL HANDOUTS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THIS DOCUMENT ARE AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The Information Contained in This Document Shall Not Be Distributed to Foreign Intelligence or Third Parties
TOP SECRET

TARGET NO	TYPE	GEO. COORDS						UTM GRID COORDS				MIN. CHAR. GRID		DCI ELEVATION	P.V. ANALYSIS REFERENCE	
		LAT. - NORTH			LONG. - EAST						SPHEROID					
		DEG	MIN	SEC	DEG	MIN	SEC									
4251D	A	25	35	41.	44	00	08.	41U	NZ	2173	2778	CLK				C427 4 7MA
4251D	C	25	35	41.	44	00	08.	41U	NZ	2173	2778	CLK				C427 4 7MA
4252LD	A	32	14	43.	14	30	05.						500	740	145	TTI K 59
4252LD	C	32	14	43.	14	30	05.						500	740	145	TTI K 59
4253D	A	33	21	07.	47	10	37.									C427 19 6MA
4253D	C	33	21	07.	47	10	37.									C427 19 6MA
4254C	A	35	19	12.	47	07	12.						530	V93		C340 5214 25MA
4254C	C	35	19	12.	47	07	12.						530	V93		C340 5214 25MA
4255D	A	35	20	51.	40	09	20.	41U	NA	5973	9149	CLK			550	C427 1 15A
4255D	C	35	20	51.	40	09	20.	41U	NA	5973	9149	CLK			550	C427 1 15A
4256D	A	36	30	12.	40	44	35.	37S	FA	561	413	INT			1000	C340 22AL
4256D	C	36	30	12.	40	44	35.	37S	FA	561	413	INT			1000	C340 22AL
4257D	A	35	28	13.	39	00	44.								775	C427 1 1A
4257D	C	35	28	13.	39	00	44.								775	C427 1 1A
4258C	A	36	13	10.	37	09	11.	37S	CA	3399	0993	INT			1220	C341 24 11MA
4258C	C	36	13	24.	37	09	23.	37S	CA	3429	1036	INT			1220	C341 24 11MA
4259F	A	33	29	.	36	18	.									50426 19 1MA
4259F	C	33	29	.	36	18	.									50426 19 1MA
4260F	A	34	42	38.	36	42	24.	37S	HU	8994	4340	INT				0426 9 10A
4260F	C	34	42	38.	36	42	24.	37S	HL	8994	4340	INT				0426 9 10A
4261B	A	34	42	25.	36	38	25.						052	057	1666	TTI 2 53
4261B	C	34	42	25.	36	38	25.						052	057	1666	TTI 2 53
5000A	A	47	05	50.	18	24	58.	34T	CT	0408	2489	INT			300	0252 10 3MA
5000A	C	47	05	50.	18	24	58.	34T	CT	0408	2489	INT			390	0252 10 3MA
5001A	A	47	18	33.	19	46	35.	34T	PT	0751	4037	INT			400	0251 1 14MA
5001A	C	47	18	33.	19	46	35.	34T	PT	0751	4037	INT			400	0251 1 14MA
5002A	A	46	30	29.	23	53	00.	34T	GS	2121	5468	INT				0251 9 13MA
5002A	C	46	30	29.	23	53	00.	34T	GS	2121	5468	INT				0251 9 13MA
5003A	A	44	15	20.	20	15	09.	34T	OG	4100	7651	INT			255	0251 16 16MA
5003A	C	44	15	20.	20	15	06.	34T	OG	4096	7692	INT			265	0251 16 16MA
5003A	A	44	15	52.	20	15	54.	34T	OG	4199	7565	INT			265	0251 16 16MA
5003F	U	44	15	20.	20	15	09.	34T	OG	4100	7651	INT			265	0251 16 16MA
5004A	A	44	49	11.	20	18	01.	34T	OG	4066	6329	INT			330	0251 16 16MA
5004A	C	44	49	21.	20	18	08.	34T	OG	4481	6319	INT			330	0251 16 16MA
5004A	U	44	49	11.	20	18	01.	34T	OG	4066	6329	INT			330	0251 16 16MA
5005A	A	44	48	54.	20	24	03.	34T	OG	5262.	6267.	INT	243	0251 16 16MA
5005A	C	44	48	54.	20	24	17.	34T	OG	5273.	6242.	INT	243	0251 16 16MA
5005A	U	44	48	54.	20	24	03.	34T	OG	5262.	6267.	INT	243	0251 16 16MA
5006A	F	45	53	58.	15	31	42.	33T	AL	4100	8310	INT			510	0252 13 12MA
5006A	C	45	54	02.	15	31	51.	33T	WL	4119	8329	INT			510	0252 13 12MA

TOP SECRET

TARGET NO.	TYPE BURST	GEO. COORDS						UTM GRID COORDS				SPHEROID	MIL. CHAR. GRID		SGZ ELEVATION	P.V. ANALYSIS REFERENCE
		LAT. - NORTH			LONG. - EAST											
		DEG	MIN	SEC	DEG	MIN	SEC									
5155A	C	33	20	37.	43	35	32.		VO	6919	6083	CLK			265	0427 19 6MA
5157A	A	35	20	46.	44	17	22.	41U	NZ	3545	0005	CLK			1001	0427 4 12MA
5157A	C	35	20	46.	44	17	22.	41U	NZ	3545	0005	CLK			1001	0427 4 12MA
5158A	A	35	28	01.	44	21	28.						F34	T75	1000	TTI 5 61
5158A	C	35	28	03.	44	21	21.						F49	U02	1000	TTI 5 61
5158A	U	35	28	01.	44	21	28.						F34	T75	1000	TTI 5 61
5159A	A	36	18	18.	43	08	44.		YK	8895	2248		G49	T26	780	50340 8214 25MA
5159A	C	36	18	18.	43	08	44.		YK	8895	2248		G59	T26	780	50340 8214 25MA
5160A	A	30	25	18.	47	38	26.			5349	3873	CLK			64	50445 10 15MA
5160A	C	30	25	23.	47	38	26.			5351	3902	CLK			64	50445 10 15MA
5160A	U	30	25	18.	47	38	26.			5349	3873	CLK			64	50445 10 15MA
5161A	A	36	10	58.	37	13	05.						G20	T28	1280	TTI L 61
5161A	C	36	10	58.	37	13	05.						G20	T28	1280	TTI L 61
5162A	A	33	28	52.	36	13	41.			9562	7087	CLK				0426 19 1MA
5162A	C	33	28	43.	36	13	30.			9533	7062	CLK				0426 19 1MA
5162A	K	33	28	51.	36	13	54.			9594	7084	CLK				0426 19 1MA
5162A	U	33	28	52.	36	13	41.			9562	7087	CLK				0426 19 1MA
5163A	A	35	19	31.	40	09	23.	41U	NA	5966	H900	CLK			820	0427 1 16A
5163A	C	35	19	31.	40	09	23.	41U	NA	5966	H900	CLK			820	0427 1 16A
5164A	A	33	37	43.	36	44	02.			4272	H500				2057	0426 14 14MA
5164A	C	33	37	43.	36	44	02.			4272	H500				2057	0426 14 14MA
5165A	A	35	07	04.	36	42	34.	375	BU	9152	H873	INT			1014	0426 9 2A
5165A	C	35	07	08.	36	42	34.	375	BU	9152	H873	INT			1014	0426 9 2A
5166A	A	36	11	02.	37	35	03.						G00	U00	1207	TTI 7 60
5166A	C	36	11	10.	37	35	06.						G25	L90	1207	TTI 7 60
5166A	U	36	11	02.	37	35	03.						G00	U00	1207	TTI 7 60
5167A	A	33	33	38.	36	10	26.			9071	7978				2920	0426 18 4MA
5167A	C	33	33	38.	36	10	26.			9071	7978				2920	0426 18 4MA
5168A	A	30	34	19.	32	05	54.			72010	87378				49	50447 7 15MA
5168A	C	30	34	19.	32	05	54.			72010	87378				49	50447 7 15MA
5168A	K	30	34	17.	32	06	16.			72070	87379				49	50447 7 15MA
5169A	A	30	05	45.	31	21	34.			64938	82053				303	50447 12 5MA
5169A	C	30	05	35.	31	21	40.			64952	82020				303	50447 12 5MA
5169A	K	30	05	31.	31	21	24.			64911	82010				303	50447 12 5MA
5169A	U	30	05	45.	31	21	34.			64938	82053				303	50447 12 5MA
5170A	A	30	07	53.	31	24	19.			65376	82452				311	50447 12 5MA
5170A	C	30	07	57.	31	23	50.			65300	82462				311	50447 12 5MA
5170A	K	30	07	52.	31	24	40.			65429	82449				311	50447 12 5MA
5170A	C	30	07	53.	31	24	19.			65376	82452				311	50447 12 5MA
5171A	A	30	06	51.	30	34	50.			60642	82251				490	50447 11 5MA

TOP SECRET

TARG. ID NO.	TYPE	GEO. COORDS						UTM GRID COORDS				MIL. CHAR. GRID		PSZ ELEVATION	P.V. ANALYSIS REFERENCE																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																													
		LAT. - NORTH			LONG. - EAST			Easting	Northing	Zone	Spheroid	Char	Grid		Ref	Date	Time	Lat	Long																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
		DEG	MIN	SEC	DEG	MIN	SEC																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
4229	C	42	37		20	47		347	OK	8169	9432	INT				50322	22	1NA																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										</



5th Corps

FRANKFURT, GERMANY

Appendix I (Engineer Operations Map) to
Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps EDP I-62(U)

Michaelis


Lt Gen

DISTRIBUTION: Distribution List

OFFICIAL:

Hasselback
Hasselback

G3




MEMORANDUM
1st Gen

ATTENTION: Distribution List

OFFICIALS

Hassellbach
HASSZELBACK
(3)

LEGEND



- LIKELY AVENUES
OF APPROACH



- CUT LINE




- BARRIER TRACE



- ZONE BOUNDARY

TOP SECRET




3GE
15US

3

2

FEBA

FEBA DODGE



TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 3rd
Corps EDP 1-62 (U)

(1) Barrier Plan:

- (a) Armored Cavalry engineers execute obstacles as far forward of Battle Area A as time permits to effect maximum delay of enemy.
- (b) Fixing force engineers move to and concentrate effort on Battle Area A, inclusive of the Gut-Line (See Tab A), creating a barrier system to canalize enemy forces into selected killing grounds.
- (c) Reserve force engineers create a barrier on Corps North Flank in vicinity of the WETTERAU Corridor.
- (d) Corps engineer units construct barriers in depth with priority of effort to Battle Area B.

(2) Denial Plan: Within the capability, and on lower priority than the execution of essential tactical demolitions and obstacles, denial targets will be destroyed, neutralized or evacuated in time. Resources of military interest to be denied to the enemy are:

- (a) Atomic weapons and components thereof.
 - (b) Means of communications by air, rail, road, and inland waterways (installations, transport, stocks).
 - (c) Supplies and equipment useable for military operations.
 - (d) Telecommunications systems.
- (3) Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM). See Tab B (Nuclear Support Plan).

b. 3rd Armored Division:

- (1) Plan, design, prepare and execute obstacle system in Battle Area A to canalize enemy forces into selected killing grounds and to protect Corps North Flank.
- (2) Assign trace and/or target responsibility to supporting and attached units. Initially Corps engineer effort will be on Battle Area B.
- (3) Be prepared to prepare and execute 6th Inf Div barrier in vicinity of WETTERAU Corridor if placed in Corps Reserve.

c. 14th Armored Cavalry (-)(Reinf):

- (1) Plan, prepare, and execute obstacles as far forward of Battle Area A as the situation permits.
- (2) Be prepared to relieve 8th Infantry Division Brigade on MAIN River Bridges and continue missions directed in para 3f(2) below.

TOP SECRET

Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps
EDP 1-42 (U)

d. 37th Engineer Group:

- (1) Plan, design, prepare and execute barrier system in Battle Area B.
- (2) Organize the ground for defense in Battle Area B in coordination with 3rd Armored Division.
- (3) If required, assist 3rd Armored Division in planning obstacle system in Battle Area A.
- (4) Upon completion of barriers and defensive positions in Battle Area B, and time permitting, be prepared to reinforce obstacle system in Battle Area A.

e. 69th Engineer Company (Topo)(Corps).

f. Corps Reserve:

- (1) 8th Infantry Division (-)(Reinf).
 - (a) Plan, design, prepare and execute barrier system to protect Corps North flank in area of WETTERAU Corridor from Vic of CLEBERG (WA6888) to Vic of NIEDER GEUNDEN (NDO/16).
 - (b) Be prepared to prepare and execute 3rd Armored Division barrier plan if committed as fixing force.
- (2) 8th Infantry Airborne Brigade:
 - (a) With the assistance of 11th Engineer Group plan, install, and be prepared on Corps Commander's order to execute demolitions on all MAIN River bridges and navigation locks in sector.
 - (b) Effect coordination with 11th Engineer Group on decking of the MAIN-BIEBRICH railway bridge.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Tab A (Traces, Barrier Zones, and Responsibilities).
- (2) Consider all means of supplementing natural obstacles by the use of available local resources, i.e., bulk POL products stored along inland waterways might be drained into the waterway at the appropriate time and ignited to create a flame barrier.
- (3) When changes in area of responsibility occur, coordination between interested agencies will be effected to:
 - (a) Transfer pre-planned target folders, target data, and instructions for target execution.
 - (b) Transfer materials provided for the execution of pre-planned targets.

TOP SECRET

Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps
STP 1-62 (U)

- (4) Prepared targets will be guarded in accordance with STAFAG 2017. Make maximum use of "immediate" instead of "deferred" targets to conserve manpower.
- (5) Coordinate obstacle and fire support plans at all levels to canalize and trap enemy forces into killing zones.
- (6) Be prepared to employ chemical land mines and contaminants to supplement conventional demolitions and obstacles.
- (7) Units coordinate barrier plans with appropriate area commands to insure successful execution of NED/RONTU before blocking evacuation routes.
- (8)
- (9)
- (10) All rail lines and highways will be cut along the Battle Area A Cut-Line.
- (11) A minimum of two (2) copies of target folders will be prepared for each target, one (1) to be retained by the executing unit and one (1) to be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: Engineer, for forwarding to VBC IV. Subordinate headquarters may require additional copies if desired.
- (12) Conventional targets will be numbered in accordance with Tab D (Conventional Target Numbering System).
- (13) Units, having target folders on targets which were their responsibility under earlier plan but become the responsibility of other units under this plan, will transfer target folders to the major unit now having responsibility for the zone in which the target is located.
- (14) Tactical commanders will relieve engineer target guards and assume responsibility for execution of all "deferred" targets within their sector.

TOP SECRET

Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps
EDP 1-62 (U)

(15) Tab C (Detailed Barrier Overlay) - To be published upon receipt, review, and approval by this headquarters of subordinate unit barrier plans.

(16) Reports:

a. 5th Corps Field SOP.

b. Tab E (Barrier Reports) to Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan).

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: 5th Corps Admin Order EDP 1-62 (U).

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal. Annex G (Signal).

b. Command. Annex H (Engineer).

Acknowledge.

MICHAELIS

Lt Gen

Tabs:

A - Traces, Barrier Zones, and Responsibilities.

B - Nuclear Support Plan.

C - Detailed Barrier Overlay (TBP)

D - Conventional Target Numbering System

E - Barrier Reports

DISTRIBUTION: Distribution List.

OFFICIAL:

H
HASSELBACK

(-3)

(6) Conventional Demolitions:

- (a) Units will prepare conventional demolition plans to support operations in the event R-hour is delayed.
- (b) When nuclear demolitions are employed, conventional demolitions will be used to reinforce and cover gaps in time and distance of nuclear demolitions.

(7) Release Procedures:

- (a) A team notification of the initiation of nuclear warfare (R-hour announcement or order to fire the first nuclear fire mission) will be the responsibility of the parent engineer headquarters prior to team attachment to tactical units. Following attachment, responsibility for the release notification to attached teams is that of the Executive Commander of the unit to which teams are attached.

- (b) Appendix 2 (R-hour Message Procedures) to Annex D (Fire Support Plan).

- (c) Release authority delegations: Tab A to Appendix 1 (Atomic Support Plan) to Annex D (Fire Support Plan).

TOP SECRET

Tab R (Nuclear Support Plan) to Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps EDP 1-62 (4)

3. Verification at team level will be accomplished by the team leader, in the event an engineer officer is present with the team, or by the senior assembly man in the event no team officer is present and the team leader has received the release announcement. In either case verification will be accomplished by an individual other than the one who received the R-hour message or order to fire, over a different communications means, if available, and with an officer in the higher headquarters other than the one who passed the original message.

(d) Releasing commanders are authorized to release all's of fractional yield (less than 1KT) for use by regimental, brigade and comparable level commanders prior to the development of specific targets subject to the following:

1. R-hour has been declared by SACEUR.

4. Coordination with adjacent units as required.

b. 3rd Armored Division.

c. 8th Infantry Division.

d. 14th Armored Cavalry.

e. 37th Engineer Group.

f. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) 5th Corps Field SOP.

(2) Displacement and location of ADF delivery units will be reported to Corps Engineer (Main).

(3) Annex J (Atomic Support) to 7th Army Field SOP as modified by current LOI, 5th Corps, subject: Fire Support Coordination Procedures (U).

(4) Dissemination of the contents of this appendix will be restricted to that required for planning purposes.

(5) Advanced Weapons Positioning Directive (Limited Distribution). (Issued Separately).

(6) Allocations (Limited Distribution)(Issued Separately).

TOP SECRET

5TH CORPS
FRANKFURT, GERMANY

Tab 3 (Nuclear Support Plan) to Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps EFP 1-62 (U)

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces. Annex H, Engineer.

2. (S) MISSION: Divisional and non-divisional engineers plan for and emplace atomic demolitions to provide nuclear support to 5th Corps ground force commanders.

3. (TS) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Employment:

(1) The success of atomic demolition munitions is contingent upon timely resupply, adequacy of communications for command and control of delivery teams and the deliberate integration of the munitions in barrier and maneuver plans.

(2) The protection of nuclear capable units will be a matter of primary concern in all ADM planning.

(3) Target selection priorities will be as follows:

(a) Defiles, bridges and tunnels on main enemy approach routes.

(b) Critical facilities such as airfields and major logistical concentrations.

(4) Troop safety:

(a) The releasing commander initiating the nuclear fire mission is responsible for notifying all units in his sector of impending detonation.

(b) Coordination of effects, where necessary, will be accomplished prior to release of any munition.

(c) The degree of risk to which friendly troops will be exposed will be based on negligible risk criteria. A decision to accept a higher degree of risk must be a command decision made by the division, Corps or the Army commander, for each individual case.

(d) Maximum advance notification of an ADM detonation consistent with the urgency of the mission, will be provided to the Air Force through FSCC channels.

Tab B (Nuclear Support Plan) to Appendix 2 (Barrier and Denial Plan) to Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps MDP 1-62 (U)

4. (TS) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: 5th Corps ADMIN Order MDP 1-62 (U).
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: Annex H (Engineer) to 5th Corps MDP 1-62 (U).

Acknowledge.

MICHAELIS

V.3 Gen

1 Incl.

Target List (Limited Distribution)(TSF)

DISTRIBUTION: Distribution List

OFFICIAL:

HASSELBACK

G-3

TOP SECRET

d. Paragraph 2, page 2, lines 6 and 7, the words "provides US Army atomic weapons support for Allied forces as directed" are deleted.

e. Paragraph 3a, page 2, the letter "B" is changed to "C."

f. Paragraph 3b, page 2, the words "Seventh United States Army" are changed to read "Seventh Army."

g. Paragraph 3b(4), page 2, line 1 is changed to read "On order of CINCUSAREUR, release ground . . ."

h. Paragraph 3b(5), page 3, is superseded as follows:

(5) (Superseded) 32d Artillery Brigade continues present mission.

i. Paragraph 3d, page 3, the words "Berlin Command" are changed to read "US Army, Berlin."

j. Paragraphs 3g(5) and (6), page 4, are rescinded.

k. Paragraph 3h, page 4, is superseded as follows:

h. (Superseded) Northern and Southern Area Commands. USAREUR OPLAN 302, paragraph 3h, applies.

l. Paragraph 3i, page 4, is superseded as follows:

i. (Superseded) Special Ammunition Support Command. USAREUR OPLAN 302, paragraph 3i, applies.

m. Paragraph 3j(3), page 4, is changed by deleting everything after "messages" and substituting the following:

Use of nuclear weapons with yields of 10 KT or less is authorized in friendly and neutral countries provided: R-hour has been declared, and military necessity dictates. The use of nuclear weapons of larger yield than 10 KT requires the specific approval of CINCUSAREUR.

n. Paragraph 3j(5), page 4, is superseded as follows:

(5) (Superseded) Assume operational direction of Allied forces willing to accept US leadership, and provide combat and logistic support to Allies to the extent that the success of US-Allied operations will be enhanced.

TOP SECRET

b. Signal communications and electronics.

- (1) Current USAREUR Signal Operating Instructions (SOI).
- (2) Annex D.

FREEMAN
General

Annexes:

- A. Intelligence
- B. Friendly Forces
- C. Concept of Operations
- D. Signal
- E. (Not used)
- F. Civil Affairs
- G. (Not used)
- H. Logistics
- I. Personnel and Administration
- J. Demolitions
- K. Information
- L. Chemical and Biological Warfare
- M. Comptroller/Finance.

OFFICIAL:

Wagstaff
for DOLEMAN
DCSOPS

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO 128 US Forces
15 June 1964

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

Maps:

- a. Europe, North Africa and Asia 1:4,000,000 AMS 1202
Sheets 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 31A, 32, 33, 42 and 43.
- b. Europe, Middle/Near East, Asia to 90°E Long. and
North, Central and West Africa South to 0° Lat.
1:1,000,000 AMS 1301

Task Organization:

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| a. US Army Europe | CINCUSAREUR |
| b. US Naval Forces Europe | CINCUSNAVEUR |
| c. US Air Forces in Europe | CINCUSAFE |
| d. CIA Force Europe | COMCIAEUR |
| e. Support Operations Task
Force Europe | COMSOTFE |
| f. MAAGs and Missions | CHMAAGs and Missions |

1. (TS) SITUATION.

a. General:

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the Commander in Chief, United States European Command to plan to conduct early offensive operations in event of US pre-emptive attack. The definition of US pre-emption is "...US attack is launched in response to unequivocal strategic warning of impending major Sino-Soviet Bloc attack upon the US or its allies, with US forces world-wide being in a state of advanced readiness." The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed that the general war plans of unified and specified commanders and the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) will provide for execution by SIOP forces, when directed by competent authority, of two pre-emptive US Attack Options. They are Attack Option I in which the objective is the destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery forces posing a threat to the US and its allies and to US and allied forces overseas; and Attack Option II in which the objective is that of Option I plus the destruction or neutralization of other elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and military resources in being.

THIS PLAN CONSISTS OF 10 PAGES

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN
NR 100-6

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATI-
CALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

(2) This plan, Commander in Chief, US European Command Operation Plan Number 100-6 (USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6), provides for early offensive operations in the United States European Command in coordination with and exploitation of US pre-emptive attack.

b. Enemy Forces. Assum C and the current USEUCOM Joint Intelligence Estimates.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Allied Forces will conduct operations to ensure the security of their forces and territories. Those which elect to support U. S. pre-emption will accomplish their portion of EACEUR's NRP.

(2) The U. S. Strategic Air Command and the U. S. Atlantic Command will conduct strike operations to degrade enemy military capabilities to oppose the U. S. European Command and Allied Forces in Europe.

(3) The U. S. Atlantic Command will conduct operations in coordination with national commanders of allied countries to maintain sea communications from the Western Hemisphere to Europe.

(4) The U. S. Military Sea Transportation Service will control and operate sea transportation for the Department of Defense, except for that sea transportation operated by units of the United States Fleets.

(5) The U. S. Military Air Transport Service will provide, on an inter-theater basis, air transportation and medical air evacuation for the Department of Defense.

(6) U. S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean will conduct operations, as a specified command (until disestablished by the activation of a U. S. Middle East Command), in the Middle East and North Africa, exclusive of the area assigned USCINCEUR, as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(7) The U. S. Strike Command will provide a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commanders and will plan and execute contingency operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In support of this plan, U. S. Strike Command will provide two airborne divisions and the necessary troop carrier and related support aircraft and such other augmentation forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6.

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NA 100-6

(8) The U. S. National Security Agency (NSA) will provide direct signal intelligence support and/or service, as appropriate, to USCINCEUR and assist and advise USCINCEUR on signal intelligence and communication security matters, as required.

(9) The US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Air Force will provide administrative and logistic support in accordance with approved directives and agreements.

d. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Commander, Central Intelligence Agency Force, Europe (COMCIAEUR) reports to USCINCEUR upon the declaration of a Reinforced Alert, or earlier if the President so directs.

(2) Support Operations. Upon D-day, or earlier if so directed by USCINCEUR, the following units and/or activities are placed under the operational control of the Commander, Support Operations Task Force, Europe as needed for particular missions:

(a) 10th Special Forces Group.

(b) Specified elements of COMCIAEUR.

(3) MAAGs and Missions. On D-day, or earlier if so directed, CINCNELM assumes operational command of MAAGs and Missions in the CINCNELM area of responsibility.

e. Assumptions.

(1) That, if all of NATO does not join in the pre-emptive attacks and subsequent offensive operations, as a minimum, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Greece and Turkey will participate.

(2) That as Attack Option I is inadequate preparation for an offensive, Attack Option II is executed in coordination with the portions of the Scheduled Program and Regional Programs in SACEUR's NSP assigned to USEUCOM and the forces of the participating allies.

(3) That the pre-emptive attacks reduce Bloc tactical air support to a point where allied military forces are able to gain the local air superiority required to support military operations.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

(4) That political decisions to withhold nuclear attack against certain countries do not leave Soviet military capabilities directly affecting the success of allied operations in the combat area.

(5) That allied resources in Europe survive to that extent necessary to initiate a limited number of local penetrations into certain European satellite areas.

(6) That the allied logistic resupply and the reinforcing capability external to Europe are adequate to sustain such local penetrations into certain European satellite areas.

(7) That the Soviet forces in the satellites have been reinforced significantly prior to the pre-emptive attack but not sufficiently to invalidate the planned action.

(8) That the satellite armed forces have not been provided a significant nuclear capability.

(9) That chemical/biological warfare capabilities will not be employed by either side in the early stages of hostilities; however, the Soviet forces may employ chemical warfare as well as nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure.

(10) That U. S. political and psychological warfare efforts on the government level have prepared the satellite peoples for phased resistance, sabotage and uprisings in support of allied penetrations.

2. (TS) MISSION. In case pre-emptive nuclear attacks are decided upon, US Forces in Europe, with major European allied military forces, will participate in the pre-emptive strikes and exploit military and political opportunities thus generated to penetrate into certain European satellite areas in order to create situations favorable to successful satellite rebellion against Bloc domination.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation - Annex A.

b. Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR)

(1) As the land battle tactical situation permits, reduce target density of own forces during pre-emptive attacks.

(2) Deploy into battle positions.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

d. Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces in Europe (CINCEURAFE)

- (1) Deliver nuclear attacks, as ordered, in support of Attack Option II of the SIOP and the Scheduled and Regional Programs of SACEUR's NSP.
- (2) Deliver nuclear attacks, including Armed Strike Reconnaissance, to degrade the enemy ground force capability in Europe, with emphasis on Soviet forces.
- (3) Conduct maximum reconnaissance to determine the effectiveness of the pre-emptive attack, targets for further nuclear strikes and enemy reaction to the initiation of hostilities.
- (4) As directed, strike important targets in SACEUR's NSP which are not struck because allies elect not to support the pre-emptive attack.
- (5) Provide nuclear strikes in support of the ground battle scheme of maneuver.
- (6) Provide airlift in support of the ground battle scheme of maneuver.
- (7) Establish air superiority, with emphasis on air space required for ground operations and provide the tactical air support necessary for such operations.
- (8) Provide air delivery in support of unconventional warfare operations.
- (9) As Air Defense Commander for USEUCOM, conduct air defense operations, exercising command of assigned units and operational control of designated Army air defense units; protect key installations and lines of communications from air attack, with priority to those required by U. S. forces.
- (10) Conduct other air operations as the situation may dictate in the event a breakdown of communications or other factors preclude authoritative direction from appropriate higher U. S. commander.

e. Commander, Central Intelligence Agency Force, Europe (COMCIAEUR)

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR HX 100-6

(1) Conduct covert psychological warfare operations as directed by USCINCEUR and in support of national efforts in the USEUCOM area, keeping USCINCEUR informed. Endeavor to ensure that satellite peoples stage insurrections phased to support and to exploit opportunities growing from the ground battle scheme of maneuver.

(2) Conduct intelligence activities in accordance with Annex C, Intelligence.

f. Commander Special Operations Task Force, Europe (COMSOTFE)

(1) Execute Unconventional Warfare operations with emphasis on uprisings in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in coordination with the ground battle scheme of maneuver and as directed by USCINCEUR in other Soviet Bloc areas.

(2) Develop and expand Unconventional Warfare forces to carry out operations as directed by USCINCEUR and, in particular, to suppress the opposing forces in Western Europe.

g. Chiefs, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions.

(1) Serve as the implementing agency for wartime military aid for those countries to which assigned.

(2) Provide intelligence to USCINCEUR.

(3) Advise and assist host nations in the employment of their forces, as appropriate.

(4) Inform USCINCEUR of the political and military situations and trends in host countries.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Provide for the security of assigned forces with emphasis on survival in the environment of the pre-emptive nuclear attack.

(2) Conduct preparations for action in such a manner that the enemy is not alerted to U. S. intentions.

(3) Establish liaison with and coordinate operations with other U. S. and allied commanders.

(4) Assume operational control of allied forces willing to accept U. S. leadership and provide combat support to the extent essential to the success of US Allied operations.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

7
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

(5) When directed by USCINCEUR, pass operational command of designated US forces to designated allied commanders.

(6) Restore the logistic base in USEUCOM and prepare to receive reinforcements from the Zone of the Interior.

(7) Establish military government in accordance with Annex E.

(8) D-Day is the day of commencement of general war.

(9) Conduct public affairs activities in accordance with the instructions in Annex D.

(10) Instructions and tasks for the areas listed below are in the indicated annexes of USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-3:

(a) Assignment of Forces - Annex B.

(b) Chemical, Biological and Radiological Operations - Annex G.

(c) Electronic Warfare - Annex O.

(d) Evasion and Escapes - Annex P.

(e) Maps and Charts - Annex K.

(f) Psychological Warfare - Annex L.

(g) Search and Rescue - Annex N.

(h) Unconventional Warfare - Annex H.

(11) Nuclear operations will be conducted in the same manner as stated in USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-3.

(12) (a) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for execution when so directed by USCINCEUR.

(b) Major subordinate commands submit supporting plans to this headquarters within 120 days of receipt of this plan.

(c) Direct liaison among subordinate commanders in the preparation of supporting plans is authorized.

(d) Permission is granted to make extracts in preparation of supporting plans that are classified TOP SECRET, NOFORN.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION PLAN USCINCEUR NR 100-6

COMBOTFE

COMCINAEUR

J. P. McCONNELL
General USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief

ANNEXES:

- A Concept of Operations
- B Command Relationships
- C Intelligence
- D Public Affairs Activities
- E Civil Affairs

AUTHENTICATION:

B. E. Spivy

B. E. SPIVY
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO 128 US Forces

Annex A to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CONCEPT OF OPERATION

1. (TS) MISSION. In case pre-emptive nuclear attacks are decided upon, US Forces in Europe, with major European allied military forces, will participate in the pre-emptive strikes and exploit military and political opportunities thus generated to penetrate into certain European satellite areas in order to create situations favorable to successful satellite rebellion against Bloc domination."
2. (U) SUPPORTING OPERATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES. As in Basic Plan.
3. (TS) GENERAL. The United States government, in reaction to unequivocal indication that the Bloc will make a major attack on the U. S. or its allies, may launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack. If this attack is sufficiently effective, USEUCOM will, exploiting airborne augmentation from USSTRICOM and in concert with participating allies, make penetrations into certain European satellite areas to create situations favorable to their rebellion against Bloc control. Initial efforts will be to liberate East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Operations are envisaged as airborne penetrations to capital cities followed by link-ups rather than frontal assaults. As all of NATO may not elect to participate in these operations, it is envisaged that a new allied arrangement would be formed following decisions within each country. Ultimately elements of USEUCOM would be integrated into a new allied command representing this alliance.
4. (TS) PHASES OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.
 - a. Phase I
 - (1) Attacks by USCINCEUR nuclear-capable forces to degrade enemy capability as necessary to assure survival of U. S. and allied combat forces in Europe.
 - (a) Nuclear-capable forces will attack in support of the Scheduled and Regional Programs of SACEUR's NSP, exercising restraints contained in the initiating orders. USEUCOM forces will attack targets that are omitted by non-participating members of ACE.
 - (b) Nuclear-capable forces will attack other Soviet forces that constitute a threat to USEUCOM and allied forces providing such attack complies with the restraint policy ordered for the pre-emptive attack.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6
THIS ANNEX CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES

A-1

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex A to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CONCEPT OF OPERATION

now planned to be transferred to the operational command of ACE would probably be similarly transferred to the new allied command.

(3) Psychological warfare offensive to gain support for U. S. pre-emptive attacks and the subsequent penetrations.

(a) Initial efforts will be concentrated on gaining satellite support for the pre-emptive attack as being necessary to prepare the way for liberation in due course. These efforts will include action to prevent premature uprisings that cannot be militarily supported during the early period of hostilities.

(b) Subsequent efforts will focus on assisting uprisings in coordination with the ground battle scheme of maneuver.

(4) The Commander Central Intelligence Agency Force, Europe, and Commander Support Operations Task Force, Europe will develop contact with and support dissident elements in the Soviet Bloc areas and secure their assistance in acts of sabotage and insurgency in order to degrade enemy military capabilities to oppose allied penetrations.

(5) Participation in allied penetrations. Insofar as preparation for offensive operations is concerned, the pre-emptive attack can result in a broad spectrum of political and military success. The enemy military capabilities may be grossly degraded if Attack Option II is executed as assumed in this plan, or they, particularly his ground forces, may survive nearly intact if Attack Option I or selective withholding is directed. Satellite populations, if properly prepared, may be favorably disposed toward liberation so that they will, upon the appearance of authentic U. S. and allied military support, rise against the Bloc and assist in the defeat of enemy forces. Accordingly, USEUCOM forces, in concert with participating allied forces will undertake penetrations to Berlin (U. S. and West German forces) and Prague (predominantly U. S. forces). Maximum mobility, including air drop will be exploited in order to exploit the shock effect of the pre-emptive attack.

(6) Reconstitution of the U. S. logistic framework in Europe and preparation to receive reinforcements from the Zone of the Interior. While pre-emptive attack has as an objective the destruction or neutralization of the enemy strategic nuclear delivery capability, he will probably succeed in attacking some U. S. and allied logistic facilities. Further, refusal of some NATO members to participate may deny the use of existing NATO infrastructure now in the U. S. and allied logistic framework. Recovery from these conditions will be an early task for U. S. and allied logistic agencies.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 100-6

A-1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 901

Headquarters
US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO 128 U S Forces

**Annex C to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6
INTELLIGENCE**

References:

- a. USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-3 (U)
- b. USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-2 (U)
- c. USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 200-16 (U)
- d. USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 200-17 (U)

1. (TS) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

- a. The Communist regimes in the USSR, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia can be expected to resist any Western probes into Eastern Europe with all available forces at their disposal.
- b. Assuming the complete success of Attack Option II, Soviet-Satellite residual ground forces would consist of but seven Soviet and 10 Satellite divisions. The Bloc air forces would be neutralized as effective combat elements. Residual forces in the GDR would consist of four East German Army and one GSFG line divisions augmented by the bulk of the 67,000-man East German military security forces. Residual forces in Czechoslovakia would consist of two Czech Army line divisions and major elements of the 47,500-man Czech military security forces.
- c. Implementation of Attack Option II strips the USSR of any capability to significantly reinforce those Bloc forces which are currently in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
- d. In the event Attack Option II is not implemented in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Communist forces in those countries - six East German and 20 Soviet line divisions in the GDR and 14 Czech line divisions in Czechoslovakia -

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

THIS ANNEX CONSISTS OF 6 PAGES,

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

TOP SECRET 901

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) See Basic Plan.

(2) Civil Affairs (CA) Units.

(a) There are no CA Units presently available in the European Command.

(b) A list of CONUS CA Units is attached as Appendix 1 of this Annex. This list is made available for planning guidance. CA Units will be made available to this command by the JCS.

(3) Personnel in MAAGs and Missions, State Department Offices, other US Governmental Agencies and voluntary relief organizations, will provide valuable advice and assistance to CA staff and units.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) See Basic Plan.

(2) CA Dets operating with MAAGs or Missions in countries under USCINCEUR will be detached to appropriate command in accordance with para 1d(3), Basic Plan.

d. Area Intelligence.

(1) Annex C, Intelligence.

(2) Area studies and information provided by MAAGs and Missions.

e. Assumptions.

(1) See Basic Plan.

(2) US control in satellite areas will be required initially, and qualified Civil Affairs (GS) staffs for all echelons of command will be established from military and civilian resources in EUCOM, or have a high priority for movement from CONUS.

(3) Allied governments participating with the US will provide qualified Civil Affairs specialists to assist in military government operations upon the establishment of an Allied Command.

(4) Capable, reliable civil servants in nonsensitive positions can be relied upon to continue to function in the administration of military government in satellite countries.

(5) The Federal Republic of Germany will insist on strong representation in the administration of military government in East Germany in order to provide conditions for the future annexation of East Germany without difficulty.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(6) Representatives of the Department of State will be designated to serve as political advisors (POLAD) on the staffs of appropriate commands, with overall functions as agreed between the Departments of State and Defense.

(7) The nuclear exchange will result in extensive damage to many municipalities and industrial areas, and will require substantial assistance to restore the economic viability in these areas.

(8) East Germany and Czechoslovakia may be accorded a status of co-belligerency upon the establishment of a friendly government.

2. (TS) MISSION.

USCINCEUR will conduct civil affairs operations in Western Europe, and employ the military government phase of civil affairs in satellite countries, to insure the establishment of governments friendly and co-operative with the Free World.

3. (TS) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) See Annex A.

(2) Upon the establishment of an Allied Command, USCINCEUR will instigate the establishment of an Allied Civil Affairs Committee, to assist him in discharging his responsibilities in the military government phase of civil affairs planning and operations.

(3) USCINCEUR will establish a Civil Affairs Division (J-5) to promulgate Civil Affairs policy and guidance for all forces under his command, and for those Allied Forces cooperating with USEUCOM.

(4) Civil Affairs operations conducted in support of this plan will range from military-civil relations with the governments and people in friendly countries cooperating with the US in Western Europe, to the employment of the military government phase of Civil Affairs in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(a) Civil Affairs operations in Western Europe may result in the requirement for commanders to exercise some authority and perform some functions of government when local authorities are unwilling or incapable of conducting effective administration. The degree of control should be consistent with the requirements to support tactical operations, and will be covered by a CA, SOF or other agreement when possible.

(b) Military government operations will be conducted on a scale consistent with the cooperation and capability of indigenous officials to function in support of US operations. The degree of control employed will be that required to insure the establishment of a

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

E-3

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

friendly, reliable indigenous administration. Authority will be phased to the friendly indigenous administration as rapidly as capable administrators are cleared by USCINCEUR.

(c) Commanders must be prepared to assume full legislative, executive and judicial authority pending reconstitution of a reliable administration. DA maintains CA Units (listed in Appendix I) to assist commanders in exercising this authority. Conversely, commanders should be alert for a favorable reaction by the civil populace to US operations and employ only those controls necessary to maintain order. Maximum cooperation and assistance will be provided friendly officials in the restoration of public facilities and services, and public administration.

(3) USCINCEUR will coordinate the re-establishment of a friendly government in East Germany with the Federal Republic of Germany in order to reconstitute a new government in consonance with the Federal Republic, and to enlist assistance from the Federal Republic in reconstituting the new administration, taking all possible measures to prevent the reunification of West and East Germany.

b. Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe. (CINCUSAR-EUR)

(1) Conduct Civil Affairs operations in Western Europe as required to support operations.

(2) Conduct Military Government in East Germany and Czechoslovakia until relieved by this Headquarters.

(3) Determine and arrange with the Department of the Army for CA Units required to assist in civil affairs operations in Western Europe, and to be employed in the administration of military government in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(4) Provide advice, assistance and liaison to Allied Commands cooperating with USCINCEUR, in the conduct of civil affairs operations.

(5) Establish provisional CA Units to support operations pending augmentation from CONUS.

(6) Coordinate with the military forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and other Allies cooperating with the US, in the conduct of military government operations in East Germany.

(7) Furnish relief supplies as determined in accordance with Reference c, to prevent disease, starvation and unrest of the civil populace.

(8) Control partisan and clandestine operations and the movement of refugees and evacuees, to preclude interference with military operations, and for the security of US and Allied Forces.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

E-4
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(9) Provide for procurement of supplies, facilities and services from indigenous sources, in Western Europe.

(10) Inform this Headquarters of requirements for qualified specialists in matters of concern to the Air Force, and Navy if required.

(11) Coordinate with other US Governmental agencies and voluntary relief organizations on the Continent to insure maximum support of civil affairs and military government operations.

(12) Establish contact with persons identified as sympathetic to the West and known to have governmental and leadership potential for use in reconstituting administrations friendly and cooperative with the Free World.

(13) Employ PSYWAR Consolidation Units in support of Civil Affairs Groups.

(14) Establish an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 in all major headquarters to include divisions and separate commands.

c. Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe, (CINCLANTFLT)

(1) Furnish CINCLANTFLT, at his request, assistance and support of civil affairs activities.

(2) Furnish CA personnel to US Marine Corps Units operating in the USEUCOM area.

(3) Conduct Civil Affairs activities in the UK until relieved by this Headquarters.

d. Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Europe, (CINCPACAF)

(1) Furnish CINCPACAF, at his request, assistance and support of civil affairs activities and military government operations.

(2) Conduct Civil Affairs activities in Spain, Portugal and North Africa until relieved by this Headquarters.

e. Chiefs, MAAGs and Missions.

(1) In the countries involved assist in the implementation of civil affairs operations in the Middle East.

(2) Assist CA units deployed to USEUCOM in becoming acquainted with personalities and conditions to expedite and facilitate effective civil affairs operations.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

E-5

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(3) Assist CA staffs and units in maintaining liaison with the military forces and governments in USEUCOM's area of responsibility.

(4) Assist CA staffs and units in their coordination with AEMEB and other US Governmental Agencies operating in the countries in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

2. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Bulk issue of essential supplies at national and/or regional (provincial) levels will be accomplished as rapidly as civilian agencies can be established.

(2) Civil affairs and psychological and unconventional warfare plans will be coordinated to insure that necessary CA tasks are executed.

(3) Public archives will be preserved at all levels of command to facilitate the re-establishment of local, regional and national governments.

(4) Commanders will, to the extent feasible, take measures to preserve the industrial capacity and governmental facilities during offensive operations.

(5) When required, submit requests to USCINCEUR for policy decisions on civil affairs matters not covered herein or otherwise provided.

(6) Applicable guidance contained in Annex N (Civil Affairs) to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-1 and not repeated herein, will be utilized.

4. (TS) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administration.

USEUCOM will be guided by instructions contained in Para 40708, a, JCS Publication 2 (UNAAF), which lists areas in which the Department of State has primary or collateral interest, in determining policies to be followed in the administration of military government in satellite areas.

(1) Governmental Functions.

(a) Civil Government. Commanders will utilize existing local governments as areas are uncovered, pending screening of officials and modifications and replacement of the governmental system in accordance with instructions issued by this Headquarters.

(b) Legal. Commanders will provide for control and supervision of local civil and criminal courts. CA Courts will be established as required, and upon authority of this Headquarters.

E-6

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(c) Public Safety. Commanders will utilize, to the extent feasible, existing public safety organizations during the combat phase; a complete examination of the public safety organization will be required as early as possible. Civil defense plans will be coordinated with military rear area defense and damage control plans.

(d) Public Health. Commanders will initially take measures to protect the health of the military force; prevent undue suffering and distress of the civil populace; and provide for the restoration of public water and sewage facilities and local hospitals on a minimum basis to preclude epidemics and to assist local authorities in becoming self-sufficient in this respect.

(e) Public Welfare. Delegate control and supervision of local welfare agencies where possible, with monitorship by CA personnel; and, coordinate outside help from other nations.

(f) Public Finance. Commanders will establish safeguards, prevent acquisition of public funds by present regimes, and provide for the stabilization of currency.

(g) Labor. Existing labor organizations will be dissolved pending a complete examination of the Communist apparatus in this field. Local laws, wages and practices will be respected consistent with the requirements of the military forces.

(h) Public Education. School buildings and other educational facilities will not be used when other facilities are available; commanders will plan to place children back in school as early as possible to remove them from interference with US operations. Ultimately, educators and instructional materials will have to be screened to remove or eliminate Communist orientation.

(2) Economic Functions.

(a) Economic. The initial effort in this field will be limited to that required to assist military operations. Early action will be taken to commence restoration of the economy consistent with the availability of CA units from CONUS, and in accordance with relative instructions contained herein.

(b) Commerce and Industry. Local production of items to prevent disease, and unrest, and such other production possible, based on availability of raw materials and labor to restore self-sufficiency (reduce dependency on the US for support), will be supported by commanders.

(c) Food and Agriculture. Maximum assistance will be rendered to agriculture production when the combat situation permits; local procurement of food supplies will be held to a minimum; every effort will be made to reduce dependency on the US and its Allies for support of the civil populace.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

E-7

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(d) Price Control and Rationing. Effective measures will be employed to effect a fair distribution of available food stocks, and to prevent inflation and black marketing.

(e) Property Control. Except for meeting the exigencies of combat support, the rights and privileges of ownership will be respected in the military use of private property; commanders will take measures to prevent the removal of state property from the area.

(f) Civilian Supply. Maximum use will be made of indigenous officials, facilities and organizations to administer and distribute relief supplies, under CA supervision.

(3) Public Facilities.

(a) Public Works and Utilities. Restoration of public works and utilities will be limited to that necessary to facilitate combat operations, and to support measures to prevent disease and extreme discomfort of the civil populace.

(b) Public Communications. Initially communication facilities will be utilized for military purposes; restoration of necessary communications will be required to assist the new government in the administration of the country.

(c) Public Transportation. Maximum military assistance will be required to rehabilitate transportation facilities to support military operations; allocation of transportation for civil use will be phased as rapidly as possible to support the distribution of food and supplies for local civilian consumption.

(4) Special Functions.

(a) Displaced Persons. Collection, evacuation and control of displaced persons will be accomplished as required to facilitate combat operations; handling of these persons will be in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare, and accomplished by indigenous public officials insofar as possible.

(b) Civil Information. All civil information media and release of information to the public will be strictly controlled as a part of the military government operation; psychological warfare operations will be coordinated with civil information.

(c) Arts, Monuments, and Archives. Commanders will insure that national arts and monuments are preserved consistent with the military mission, as a means to enlist and foster the willing cooperation and support of the civilian population; archives will be preserved wherever possible as a prime requirement to assist in the reconstitution of new governments.

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

E-8

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex E to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6 CIVIL AFFAIRS

(d) Religious Affairs. Use of churches and religious institutions for military purposes will be avoided, and the customs, traditions, and sentiments of the civil populace in religious matters will be respected; assistance will be rendered to restore religious organizations that may have been purged by Communist dominated regimes.

b. Logistics.

(1) Supplies required for the relief of distress within the area of combat operations will be given a logistical priority second only to that essential for the conduct of combat operations.

(2) Civilian vehicles used for the continuation of the war effort and aiding the civilian economy will be permitted access to and travel on MSR's.

(3) Guidance for the policy on emergency supply of civil populations subject to military operations is contained in Section 4, Chapter X, JCS Pub Nr. 3. Requirements will be estimated and provided for in advance.

5. (TS) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command.

(1) Initially, civil affairs command will follow military command.

(2) A Theater Army Civil Affairs Command (TACAC) will be established upon orders of this Headquarters to administer military government in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

b. Signal.

(1) Initially, CA Units will rely on common user service.


(2) Upon establishment of military government operations the TACAC will be allocated (governmental) communication service as required.

J. P. McCONNELL
General USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief

APPENDICES:

1. Civil Affairs Organizations

AUTHENTICATION:


D. E. SHIVY
Major General, US Army
Director, J-3 Division

E-9

TOP SECRET

Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN NR 100-6

PRINTED IN ENGLAND